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INTRODUCTION 
As privatization of publicly funded university research has 
grown, so too has the steady undercurrent of public criticism of 
academic patenting from both inside and outside the academy. During 
debates over the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, which standardized federal 
policy to allow grant recipients to patent resulting inventions,1 Senator 
Russell Long called it “one of the most radical and far-reaching 
giveaways” he had seen.2 In his 2003 Universities in the Marketplace, 
former Harvard president Derek Bok worried that “the lure of the 
marketplace” might cause universities to compromise their core 
values.3 Jennifer Washburn’s 2005 University, Inc. lamented 
commercialization as a “foul wind [that] has blown over the campuses 
of our nation’s universities” since 1980 in pursuit of benefits that are 
“vastly overblown.”4 In 2019, freshman congresswoman (and Twitter 
sensation) Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez used her first committee 
hearings to question why the public is “putting tons of money in the 
development of drugs that then become privatized, and then they 
receive no return on the investment that they have made.”5 
What return does the public receive for the tax dollars spent on 
R&D, primarily at universities? Does privatizing this research through 
patent law in fact serve public values?6 From this social welfare 
 
 1. See Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211). 
 2. Celia W. Dugger, House Panel Votes Patent Law Change, WASH. POST, 
July 25, 1980, at A9 (quoting Senator Russell Long). 
 3. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, at x (2003). 
 4. JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION 
OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, at ix, xii (2005). 
 5. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, AOC on Pharma & Public Funding, WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION (Feb. 3, 2019), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2019/02/aoc-on-
pharma-public-funding.html [https://perma.cc/NX79-E7V7] (quoting 
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez). 
 6. We take no position on the largely academic question of whether patent 
law is in fact “private law.” See generally Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property and 
the New Private Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2017) (noting that intellectual 
property “is more public and administrative than classic areas of private law” but that 
“[t]here are few things more contested in the legal academy than the nature of private 
law, whether it has a nature, and if it even exists at all”). 
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perspective, could the Bayh–Dole framework be improved? In this 
symposium contribution, we seek to tackle these questions, 
identifying the key empirical questions that must be resolved to 
answer them. In short, we conclude the benefits of university patenting 
may justify the costs where licensees need exclusivity to undertake the 
costs of commercialization. For the substantial portion of university 
patenting that is not necessary for commercialization, evidence of 
other plausible benefits is not yet sufficient to justify the costs. Much 
of the data needed to investigate these plausible benefits—and related 
costs—rests in the hands of universities and federal grant agencies. 
Unless defenders of university patenting develop this evidence, 
university patenting should be curtailed in ways discussed further 
below. 
Understanding the net benefits of university patenting is crucial 
to setting innovation policy because universities are substantial 
players in the U.S. innovation ecosystem. In 2015, they conducted 
nearly 50% of basic research in the United States and 13% of all 
R&D.7 Out of the nearly $65 billion spent on R&D at U.S. universities 
in 2015, over half (52%) came from the federal government,8 27% 
came from university funds, 10% came from other nonprofits such as 
foundations, and 6% came from each of non-federal governments and 
for-profit businesses.9 For research funded by the federal government, 
the Bayh–Dole Act was passed in 1980 to alleviate uncertainty about 
patent rules for grant recipients.10 Under the Bayh–Dole framework, 
universities and other recipients of federal grants may “elect to retain 
title to” inventions created under those grants.11 We will focus here on 
 
 7. See NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, at 4-20 
tbl. 4-3 (2018). 
 8. These figures include “indirect costs” such as maintaining facilities. The 
overhead rate averages 52% for NIH grants, so that for every $100,000 spent on 
research, the agency pays up to an additional $52,000 to cover indirect costs. Jocelyn 
Kaiser, NIH Plan to Reduce Overhead Payments Draws Fire, SCIENCE (June 2, 2017, 
3:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/nih-plan-reduce-overhead-
payments-draws-fire [https://perma.cc/8WZC-NHTS].  
 9. See NAT’L SCI. BD., supra note 7, at 4-20 tbl. 4-3. 
 10. For reviews of university patenting before Bayh–Dole and the factors 
leading to the Act’s passage, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private 
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 
82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671–91 (1996); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 30–32 (2013); and Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research 
in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772 
(2006). 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2018). Although the statute refers to a “nonprofit 
organization or small business firm,” id., this has been extended to large businesses 
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university patents stemming from public funding, though many of our 
arguments also apply to university patents that are not Bayh–Dole 
patents, and to Bayh–Dole patents that are not university patents.12 
Patent rights for federal grant recipients come with certain 
restrictions. A Bayh–Dole patent application must note “that the 
Government has certain rights in the invention.”13 The funding agency 
may “require periodic reporting on the utilization” of the invention.14 
The agency has a free, nonexclusive license to practice the invention 
“for or on behalf of the United States,” and the agency may use 
“[m]arch-in rights” to grant additional licenses.15 Agencies have used 
the threat of royalty-free licenses and march-in rights to attain price 
reductions.16 If the invention is exclusively licensed, any resulting 
products must be “manufactured substantially in the United States” 
unless “domestic manufacture is not commercially feasible.”17 
Universities must also give a preference to small businesses and 
cannot assign rights without the agency’s approval.18 
Why are patents and grants combined through this particular 
legal structure? Patents and direct federal research funding are the two 
most significant U.S. innovation policies for facilitating financial 
transfers from consumers to inventors.19 Under the Bayh–Dole 
 
by Executive Order and regulation. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.1(b) (2019) (noting that the 
implementing regulations “appl[y] to all funding agreements with business firms 
regardless of size (consistent with [earlier Executive Orders])”). There are a few 
exceptions, including for certain contractors of the Department of Energy. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 202(a)(iv) (2018). 
 12. The policy goals of Bayh–Dole seem to apply regardless of the type of 
grantee. And although universities are legally required to follow Bayh–Dole only for 
inventions stemming from federal funding, universities typically have standardized 
patent policies for all inventions, both for administrative simplicity and because 
universities—as nonprofit institutions with educational missions—often have similar 
policy goals to those set out in Bayh–Dole. We will thus use “university patent” and 
“Bayh–Dole patent” somewhat interchangeably. 
 13. § 202(c)(6). 
 14. § 202(c)(5). 
 15. §§ 202(c)(4)–(5), 203. 
 16. See Several March-in and Royalty Free Rights Cases, Under the Bayh–
Dole Act, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, https://www.keionline.org/cl/march-in-
royalty-free [https://perma.cc/8UFU-HUU4] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); cf. Ryan 
Whalen, Note, The Bayh-Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: 
Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1106 (2015) 
(describing the failure of agencies to formally trigger these rights). 
 17. See § 204. 
 18. See § 202(c)(7). 
 19. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–
Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 319–21 (2013) [hereinafter Hemel & Ouellette, 
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framework (and the similar Stevenson–Wydler framework for 
national laboratories),20 these policy tools are used as complements, 
not substitutes. In prior work with Daniel Hemel, Ian Ayres, and 
Andrew Tutt, one of us (Ouellette) has discussed the relative benefits 
of patents and direct research funding,21 as well as the benefits that 
their combination might have for ex post commercialization,22 ex ante 
incentives,23 and overall research funding levels.24 This Article draws 
on this prior work, as well as the work of numerous other scholars who 
have questioned the current Bayh–Dole framework from a social 
welfare perspective.25 In making this assessment, it is important to 
remember that university patents—like patents in general—impose 
costs, including increased deadweight loss, transaction costs, and 
negative changes in the practice and norms of science.26 The key 
question is thus: Is society getting a benefit that outweighs these costs? 
 
Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate]; Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 551–52 (2019) [hereinafter Hemel 
& Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism]. 
 20. The Stevenson–Wydler Act of 1980 allows inventions created at federal 
laboratories to be patented. See 15 U.S.C. § 3710(b)–(c) (2018); Adam B. Jaffe & 
Josh Lerner, Reinventing Public R&D: Patent Policy and the Commercialization of 
National Laboratory Technologies, 32 RAND J. ECON. 167, 170–71 (2001). 
 21. See generally Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 
supra note 19; Hemel & Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, supra note 19. 
 22. See generally Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for 
Bayh–Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271 (2017) (proposing a “market test” 
approach to federally funded inventions to assess whether exclusivity is needed for 
commercialization). 
 23. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Andrew Tutt, How Do Patent 
Incentives Affect University Researchers?, 61 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 105883 (2020). 
 24. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh–Dole 
Beyond Borders, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 282 (2017) [hereinafter Hemel & Ouellette, 
Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders] (explaining why Bayh–Dole may increase public 
spending on scientific research). 
 25. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert Cook-Deegan, Universities: 
The Fallen Angels of Bayh–Dole?, 147 DAEDALUS 76, 78–79 (2018); see also Mark 
A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L. J. 611, 611–12 (2008); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh–Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 689, 689 
(2003); Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, An Empirical Study of University 
Patent Activity, 7 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 51, 55 (2017). 
 26. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, at 281 (reviewing the literature on 
these costs); Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting 
Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 238–39 (2006); Arti Kaur Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 136 (1999). 
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We begin in Part I with a brief overview of U.S. university 
practices in filing, licensing, and litigating patents. Part II focuses on 
the primary justification for university patents: that they promote ex 
post commercialization, either through exclusivity itself or by 
providing an incentive for university researchers to help develop their 
inventions. As we explain, evidence of this benefit is compelling for 
some inventions but cannot support the current scope of university 
patenting activity. The remainder of the Article thus considers other 
justifications for patents that do not seem necessary for 
commercialization.27 Part III examines how patents affect ex ante 
incentives for university researchers. Part IV sets out two mechanisms 
by which patents might increase university research funding: 
increased internal university research funds and higher federal grant 
appropriations. Part V discusses the effect of university patents 
abroad, including the efficiency and distributional effects that patents 
in other high-income countries may have. We conclude by setting out 
an agenda for university patenting research: a summary of the research 
questions that we think must be addressed to provide a more 
conclusive assessment of the social impact of university patenting. We 
advocate for rigorous policy experiments to answer these questions, 
which could be run by institutional actors including universities, 
government funding agencies (including state and non-U.S. funders), 
and private research foundations in partnership with academics. 
I. WHAT DO UNIVERSITY PATENT PRACTICES LOOK LIKE TODAY? 
University patenting practices vary widely. Knowledge and 
discussion about current university patenting practices is largely 
informed by the annual survey conducted by the Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM), a nonprofit organization 
of academic professionals from the technology transfer offices (TTOs) 
of more than 800 universities and other institutions.28 While helpful 
 
 27. One justification for patents in general that is not considered in this 
Article is the incentive to disclose new scientific knowledge. As one of us has argued 
in prior work, patents do serve an important disclosure function. See Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 421, 421 (2017). But 
this benefit cannot bear the weight of justifying the costs of the patent system. See 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 531, 534–35 (2012). And the disclosure benefit of patents is far more attenuated 
in the university context, where inventors have strong independent justifications to 
publish their results in the scientific literature. 
 28. See Statistics Access for Technology Transfer (STATT) Database, ASS’N 
OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, https://autm.net/surveys-and-tools/databases/statt 
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for illuminating general trends of AUTM members, the survey’s broad 
categories and changes over time limit its use for answering even basic 
questions such as what percentage of university inventions are 
governed by Bayh–Dole,29 what percentage are licensed exclusively,30 
and how practices vary by technology. 
This general lack of transparency, especially with regard to the 
role that university patents play in the commercialization of 
technologies, is exacerbated by the fact that while the patents 
themselves are publicly available, licenses are private and not subject 
to FOIA requests—at least at private universities.31 This makes 
aggregating quantitative data regarding terms and conditions more 
difficult. In addition, some university inventors bypass their university 
TTOs and patent inventions themselves, such that AUTM numbers are 
an underestimate of academic patenting activity and start-up 
formation.32 
A. Growth in University Patenting 
The Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 was not the start of university 
patenting; as Bhaven Sampat has explained, it simply “magnified and 
 
[https://perma.cc/9GY8-76T7] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) [hereinafter AUTM 
SURVEY]. For instructions, see ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, LICENSING SURVEY: 
2014 INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS (2015) [hereinafter AUTM SURVEY 
INSTRUCTIONS]. On AUTM membership, see Who We Are, ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. 
MANAGERS, https://autm.net/about-autm/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/D26H-Z5P7] 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 29. In theory, researchers should be able to determine this statistic from 
public patent data because Bayh–Dole patents must include “a statement specifying 
that the invention was made with Government support and that the Government has 
certain rights in the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (2018). In practice, many Bayh–
Dole patents fail to include these statements. See Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, 
Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 10 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 953, 954 (2012). 
 30. The survey does ask for the number of exclusive and nonexclusive 
licenses granted, but not for how many distinct inventions those licenses cover. See 
AUTM SURVEY, supra note 28. 
 31. See Hannah Schwarz, Finding and Funding the Cure, YALE DAILY NEWS 
(Oct. 30, 2015, 3:48 AM), https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2015/10/30/finding-and-
funding-the-cure [https://perma.cc/2PQZ-RG4D]. 
 32. See T. Taylor Aldridge & David Audretsch, The Bayh–Dole Act and 
Scientist Entrepreneurship, 40 RES. POL’Y 1058, 1059 (2011); Christopher S. Hayter 
& Mary K. Feeney, Determinants of External Patenting Behavior Among University 
Scientists, 44 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 114 (2017); Gideon D. Markman, Peter T. 
Gianiodis & Phillip H. Phan, Full-Time Faculty or Part-Time Entrepreneurs, 55 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MGMT. 29, 34 (2008). 
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accelerated” changes that were already occurring in America’s 
innovation institutions.33 Similarly, Elizabeth Popp Berman has 
argued that Bayh–Dole cemented the turn toward academic 
patenting.34 The solid line in Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase in 
U.S. university patenting over the past fifty years. According to data 
collected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), in 1970, 
U.S. universities were granted a total of 198 patents; in 2012, that 
number was 4,797.35 From Bayh–Dole’s passage through 2012, the 
number of university patents issued each year grew over tenfold. 
However, a small number of universities are responsible for the vast 
majority of patenting activity. Only five individual universities—MIT, 
Stanford, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Texas, and 
Caltech—were granted more than 100 patents in 2012.36 
 
 
 33. Sampat, supra note 10, at 776. 
 34. See ELIZABETH POPP BERMAN, CREATING THE MARKET UNIVERSITY: HOW 
ACADEMIC SCIENCE BECAME AN ECONOMIC ENGINE 94–118 (2012). 
 35. See University Patent Count & Expenditures, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://developer.uspto.gov/visualization/university-patent-
count-expenditures [https://perma.cc/WGJ5-NDJ7] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 36. Id. A sixth, the University of California system, is not broken out into its 
constituent universities, but taken together, it had 357 patents granted in 2012, far 
more than the MIT, which came in second with 216 patents granted that year. Id. 
Patents originating with University of Wisconsin inventors are managed and 
prosecuted through the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF). See 
History, WIS. ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUND., https://www.warf.org/about-
us/history/history-of-warf.cmsx [https://perma.cc/W5LE-WQJV] (last visited Jan. 20, 
2020). 
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Figure 1. U.S. University Patenting Growth Since 1970 
 
 
The dashed line in Figure 1 provides the same information—
granted U.S. patents to U.S. universities—as self-reported by 
universities in the AUTM survey.37 By the early 2000s, this line 
closely matches the USPTO data, giving us greater confidence in 
using the AUTM survey results for other metrics that are not available 
from public records.  
Finally, the dotted line in Figure 1, which corresponds to the 
right-hand axis, shows U.S. university patents as a percentage of all 
patents granted by the USPTO. As this data indicates, universities 
became a more significant part of the overall patenting landscape 
between 1970 and 2000. But since the late 1990s, university patenting 
has mimicked the overall U.S. patenting trends, with the percentage 
staying relatively constant at around 2%.38 
 
 37. See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 28. Only six universities responded to 
this question in 1991 and 1992, and they each reported zero issued patents. Id. In 1993, 
119 universities reported. Id. 
 38. See Ryan & Frye, supra note 25, at 64–65 (showing that universities 
responded strategically to changes in U.S. patent law). 
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The university TTO coordinates patenting and 
commercialization, serving as the point of contact for both university 
inventors and private firms interested in acquiring rights to university-
owned IP. TTOs come in a variety of organizational forms, including 
those housed in the university itself and those that operate as affiliated 
nonprofits, such as WARF.39 Many universities created TTOs in the 
wake of Bayh–Dole, and these offices have diverse and sometimes 
conflicting motivations, including (1) commercializing university 
technologies in quantifiable and public ways to demonstrate that the 
university is serving the public interest (with the resulting reputational 
benefit),40 (2) serving entrepreneurial university faculty members 
(which may help with faculty recruitment and retention),41 and 
(3) generating revenue.42 The relative importance of different 
motivations differs by university, resulting in different approaches to 
technology transfer generally and academic patenting in particular. 
In materials presented to university inventors and the public, 
TTOs depict innovation as a cyclical process.43 Under this idealized 
description, university inventors generate useful knowledge in the 
course of their research, which they disclose to the TTO. The TTO 
evaluates each disclosure and decides whether to seek formal IP 
protection.44 If it seeks formal IP protection, it markets the IP to find 
 
 39. See History, supra note 36. 
 40. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 29 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 
2011); Carol Mimura, Nuanced Management of IP Rights: Shaping Industry–
University Relationships to Promote Social Impact, in WORKING WITHIN THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 269, 270 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 
2010). 
 41. See generally THE CHICAGO HANDBOOK OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER AND ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel & 
Mike Wright eds., 2015) (providing suggestions for universities). 
 42. See infra Section IV.A (discussing university revenue issues). 
 43. See, e.g., STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, INVENTOR’S 
GUIDE 7 (2017); see also HARVARD OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., THE INVENTOR’S 
HANDBOOK 17 (2016). This simplified picture of technology transfer is discussed, and 
complicated, in Samantha R. Bradley, Christopher S. Hayter & Albert N. Link, 
Models and Methods of University Technology Transfer, 9 FOUND. & TRENDS 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 571, 574 (2013). 
 44. See Kirsten Leute, Patenting and Licensing of University-Based Genetic 
Inventions—A View from Experience at Stanford University’s Office of Technology 
Licensing, 8 COMMUNITY GENETICS 217, 218–19 (2005) (discussing what 
considerations go into the patenting decision). Some of the factors Leute notes include 
whether the invention can be licensed absent IP protection; whether a patent could be 
enforced in a cost-effective manner; or whether the invention is best left in the public 
domain. See id. 
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and select an appropriate licensee (or multiple licensees) of the 
technology, and then it negotiates with the licensee to reach a license 
agreement. The licensee commercializes the invention and pays 
royalties to the university. Royalties are shared according to university 
policy, with some distributed to the inventors personally and some 
funneled back into further research, beginning the innovation process 
anew.45 
Policies on revenue sharing differ by university. Stanford 
University, for example, funds its Office of Technology Licensing 
with a 15% administrative fee, and then divides revenues evenly, 
providing one-third net cash royalties each to the inventor, the 
inventor’s department, and the inventor’s school.46 Harvard University 
likewise takes a 15% administrative fee, but then gives half of the 
remainder to the inventor (70% as personal compensation, 30% for 
research) and splits the other half among the department, school, 
university president’s office, and a Technology Development 
Accelerator Fund.47 Under the Bayh–Dole Act, some portion of these 
royalties must be shared with inventors,48 but there is substantial 
variation in these policies across universities and over time. Ouellette 
and Tutt have created a publicly available dataset of royalty-sharing 
policies for over 150 U.S. universities.49  
As shown in Figure 2, between 2004 and 2013, activity at these 
university TTOs has been steadily increasing.50 Invention disclosures 
rose almost 50%, which may reflect successful efforts to encourage 
researchers to report their inventions or unrelated changes in 
 
 45. For summary tables of literature relevant to this idealized process, see 
Bradley, Hayter & Link, supra note 43. 
 46. Leute, supra note 44, at 220 (discussing the 15% administrative fee at 
Stanford); Stanford Policies, STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, 
https://otl.stanford.edu/intellectual-property/stanford-policies [https://perma.cc/ 
UH8W-WYQZ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (outlining Stanford’s royalty sharing 
policy between the inventor, the inventor’s department, and the institution). 
 47. Statement of Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property (IP Policy), 
HARVARD OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., https://otd.harvard.edu/faculty-
inventors/resources/policies-and-procedures/statement-of-policy-in-regard-to-
intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/FE28-E4SY] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
 48. See Bayh–Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (1980) (stating that a 
contractor is required to share royalties with the inventor). 
 49. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Andrew Tutt, Main Page, UNIV. PATENT 
DATA, http://universitypatentdata.com/wiki/Main_Page [https://perma.cc/GKV5-
56ML] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); see also Ouellette & Tutt, supra note 23 
(discussing the university patent data set). 
 50. See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 28 (displaying disclosures, applications, 
and issued patents dated by the year of disclosure, application, and issue).  
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university research portfolios.51 New patent applications increased 
more than 40%, while patents issued increased by 66%. The increased 
ratio of applications to issued patents may reflect more success in 
prosecuting patent applications before the USPTO, or it may also 
reflect TTOs finding more licensees and therefore abandoning fewer 
applications. 
 
Figure 2. Invention Disclosures and Patenting 
 
B. Nonexclusive Licensing, Exclusive Licensing, Spinoffs, and 
Startups 
Once it decides to patent a given invention, the TTO markets and 
possibly licenses the patent. The inventor, TTO, and licensee may 
agree to an exclusive license that bars the TTO from licensing the 
patent to any other company, or they may agree to a non-exclusive 
 
 51. David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. 
Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. 
POL’Y 99, 100 (2001) (“The portfolio of university research has shifted somewhat in 
recent years independently of Bayh-Dole, and these changes are important factors 
behind the increased patenting and licensing activity. In particular, the growth in 
federal financial support for basic biomedical research in universities that began in 
the late 1960s, along with the related rise of research in biotechnology that began in 
the early 1970s, contributed to growth in university patents and licenses.”). 
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license, leaving the patent available to other licensees. According to 
data from AUTM, and as shown in Figure 3, exclusive licensing has 
been relatively constant since 2004; however, since 2008, the number 
of non-exclusive licenses has increased.52 The number of licenses 
throughout this period is close to the number of issued patents, but this 
does not mean most patents are licensed—rather, some patents are 
licensed multiple times.  
A simple division into exclusive and non-exclusive licensing 
does not capture the full range of options available to universities and 
companies. For example, licenses may also be restricted to specified 
fields, which enables TTOs to grant exclusivity to multiple licensees, 
each for a different application.53 TTOs may also impose diligence 
benchmarks and other requirements to ensure licensees are taking 
reasonable steps toward commercialization.54 The licensor often 
receives both an up-front payment and “continuation payments” in the 
form of royalties, equity, or milestone payments.55 
U.S. universities generally use exclusive licenses rather than 
outright assignments. The Bayh–Dole Act includes “a prohibition 
upon the assignment of rights to a subject invention” without the 
funding agency’s approval,56 and even for inventions not subject to 
Bayh–Dole requirements, university patenting policies often limit 
assignments.57 Recent work has found that, between 2012 and 2017, 
U.S. universities recorded only 108 assignments of 227 patent assets 
in arms-length transactions.58 But there may be many more 
 
 52. See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 28. 
 53. See STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, START-UP GUIDE 6 
(2016); Leute, supra note 44, at 219. 
 54. See STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, supra note 53, at 21; 
Leute, supra note 44, at 219. 
 55. See infra Section II.B. 
 56. See Bayh–Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7) (1980). 
 57. See, e.g., NW. UNIV., UNIVERSITY PATENT AND INVENTION POLICY 5 
(Sept. 1, 2017) (“As a general policy, the University does not sell or assign patent 
rights.”); see also STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, supra note 53, at 22 
(“Stanford does not assign or transfer IP rights.”). 
 58. Brian J. Love, Erik Oliver & Michael Costa, US Patent Sales by 
Universities and Research Institutes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 256, 267 tbl. 12.3 (Jacob H. Rooksby ed., 
2020). These sales were made by universities relatively uniformly distributed across 
the U.S. News rankings. See id. at 264 fig.12.2. Another study found that 326 out of 
106,075 patents granted to universities (including foreign universities) based on filing 
dates from 1990 to 2013 were transferred to patent-assertion entities. Stefania Fusco 
et al., Monetization Strategies of University Patents Through PAEs: An Analysis of 
US Patent Transfers, 2019 ISSI CONF. PROC. 1184, 1187 (2019). 59 out of 92 
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assignments that are not recorded at the USPTO; an analysis of patents 
owned by patent-assertion entity Intellectual Ventures in 2016 found 
500 patents originally assigned to universities, including over 100 
from the University of California, 60 from the New Jersey Institute of 
Technology, and 40 from Caltech.59 
Some universities have shifted their licensing strategy more 
toward start-up formation, and this gradual trend is reflected in AUTM 
survey results. As illustrated in Figure 3, from 2004 to 2013, the 
number of reported start-ups has almost doubled, from 403 to 747. 
AUTM defines start-up formation based on whether the company was 
created “specifically to license and develop the technology being 
licensed.”60 
 
Figure 3. Licensing and Start-Up Formation 
 
 
universities with transfers to patent-assertion entities were foreign; the U.S. 
universities with the highest number of transfers were North Carolina State University 
(38 patents), the University of Texas System (24 patents), and Duke University (11 
patents). See id. at 1188. 
 59. Yarden Katz, Universities Have Turned over Hundreds of Patents to 
Patent Trolls, MEDIUM (Oct. 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@yardenkatz/ 
universities-have-turned-over-hundreds-of-patents-to-patent-trolls-99d5cdec1d8a 
[https://perma.cc/8YFU-SR5M]. 
 60. AUTM SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 28, at 11. 
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The amount of start-up formation and the extent to which TTOs 
actively facilitate start-ups is likely influenced by the personnel that 
universities attract, university policies and programs, and the 
availability of outside partnerships and venture funding. The 
interaction among these factors can vary dramatically across different 
universities.61 
Universities appear to prefer licensing technological inventions 
back to their own faculty or student inventors than to others. Harvard 
offers to actively facilitate the inventor’s decision of whether or not to 
create a start-up.62 Even Stanford, which claims not to give 
“preferential treatment” to inventor-incorporated start-ups, has 
nonetheless “almost always” selected such start-ups and provided 
them with exclusivity.63  
Start-up creation might form the foundation of an independent 
justification for university patenting if there are reasons to prefer a 
more fragmented technology ecosystem, independent of what 
technologies are actually produced.64 But it is not obvious whether 
patenting leads to greater market concentration or fragmentation.65 
C. University Patent Assertion and Litigation 
Universities are involved in the U.S. patent ecosystem not only 
as patent owners and licensors, but also as litigants. In 2008, Mark 
Lemley wrote an article titled Are Universities Patent Trolls?, and 
while he concluded that “the general answer . . . is no,”66 the 
increasingly aggressive behavior of some universities in asserting 
their patent portfolios has caused a number of commentators to give 
them the “troll” pejorative.67 For example, Boston University 
 
 61. See Wai Fong Boh, Uzi De-Haan & Robert Strom, University Technology 
Transfer Through Entrepreneurship: Faculty and Students in Spinoffs, 41 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 661, 666–67 (2015) (interviewing 130 individuals, including founders of 
47 spinoffs, at eight U.S. universities to track different models for spinoff 
development). 
 62. See HARVARD OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., supra note 43, at 16, 26. 
 63. STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, supra note 53, at 16–17. 
 64. We thank Arti Rai for suggesting this point. 
 65. See Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Influencing Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2019); Peter Lee, 
Innovation Consolidation, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with 
authors). 
 66. Lemley, supra note 25, at 612 n.1. 
 67. E.g., Daniel Engber, In Pursuit of Knowledge, and Profit, SLATE (May 7, 
2014, 11:49 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2014/05/patent-trolls-universities-
sometimes-look-a-lot-like-trolls.html [https://perma.cc/PPJ2-QVUT] (“Universities 
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successfully sued nearly thirty leading technology firms—including 
Amazon, Apple, Dell, HP, and Microsoft—over its NSF-funded68 blue 
LED patent.69 And Carnegie Mellon University made headlines for its 
$1.5 billion award against Marvell Semiconductor, which was reduced 
to $750 million in a settlement.70 
These are not isolated lawsuits. One of us analyzed a random 
sample of 20% of all patent lawsuits filed from 2000 to 2015 and 
found 77 patent assertions involving a U.S. university patent 
plaintiff,71 suggesting that there were about 25 university patent 
assertions per year.72 The university was joined as a necessary party 
 
and patent trolls have some major traits in common . . . and that resemblance is 
growing stronger.”); see also Erin Fuchs, Tech’s 8 Most Fearsome “Patent Trolls”, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2012) (including WARF in a list of the eight “Most Fearsome 
‘Patent Trolls’”); John Koetsir, Congratulations, Boston University, You’re Now a 
Patent Troll, VENTUREBEAT (July 3, 2013 12:17 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2013/07/03/congratulations-boston-university-youre-now-a-
patent-troll [https://perma.cc/M3LS-LQ5V] (calling Boston University a patent troll 
for its lawsuit against Apple); Joe Mullin, Public University, Public Research—And 
Four Big Patent Suits, ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 11, 2014, 9:45 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/public-university-public-research-and-
four-big-patent-suits (noting increased “criticism that universities are . . . engag[ing] 
in litigation strategies similar to that of so-called ‘patent trolls’”). 
 68. See U.S. Patent No. 5,686,738 (filed Jan. 13, 1995) (claiming priority to 
an application filed Mar. 18, 1991); T. Lei et al., Epitaxial Growth of Zinc Blende and 
Wurtzitic Gallium Nitride Thin Films on (001) Silicon, 59 APPLIED PHYSICS LETTERS 
944, 946 (1991) (noting NSF support for the invention described in the patent). 
 69. See Jon Brodkin, Patent-Waving Boston U. Wins Cash from Apple, 
Amazon, and Microsoft, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:45 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/patent-waving-boston-u-wins-cash-from-
apple-amazon-and-microsoft [https://perma.cc/GRH6-S9E5] (reporting that twenty-
five defendants agreed to undisclosed licensing fees); Joel Brown, BU Wins $13 
Million in Patent Infringement Suit, BU TODAY (Dec. 7, 2015), 
http://www.bu.edu/today/2015/bu-wins-13-million-in-patent-infringement-suit 
[https://perma.cc/THH5-J7HQ] (reporting that BU won $13 million from the 
remaining three defendants). 
 70. Joe Mullin, Marvell Agrees to Pay Record-Breaking $750M to University 
to End Patent Lawsuit, ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 18, 2016, 2:43 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/marvell-will-pay-750m-to-carnegie-
mellon-university-in-massive-patent-settlement [https://perma.cc/Z922-6CWL]. 
 71. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, University Patent Plaintiffs, Presentation 
at Stanford Patent Assertion Entity Symposium (May 11, 2017) (on file with authors). 
This figure combines related cases over the same technology, such as when a 
university asserts the same patent portfolio against a number of defendants in different 
cases; there were 115 separate lawsuits. Id. For details on the random sample, see 
generally Shawn P. Miller et al., Who’s Suing Us? Decoding Patent Plaintiffs Since 
2000 with the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 235 (2018). 
 72. Analysis by Tania Bubela suggests that “educational institutions file 
between 45 and 50 patent-related suits each year in the U.S.[,]” though Bubela 
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by an exclusive licensee or co-owner of the patent in 51 of those 77 
assertions.73 In the other 26, the university directly asserted its 
patents.74 
The most detailed published investigation of university 
involvement in patent-related litigation was conducted by Jacob 
Rooksby. He found that in 2009 and 2010, universities were plaintiffs 
in 57 patent infringement lawsuits, 14 of which were filed solely by 
the university or by the university and its affiliated research entity.75 
He concluded that there was “a remarkable similarity between the 
litigation behavior of universities and for-profit actors.”76 Based on 
subsequent interview and survey work with university TTO directors 
and chief research officers, Rooksby summarized universities’ 
motivations for involvement in patent litigation, as well as the barriers 
to greater patent assertion—including incongruity with mission, 
public perception as “troll-like,” and high cost.77 Rooksby found most 
universities are reluctant to enforce their patents in litigation.78  
Finally, these litigation events are just a small window into 
university patent assertion activity. Robin Feldman and Mark Lemley 
surveyed practicing companies and found that 82% of respondents 
said a lawsuit rarely (0–10% of the time) preceded those patent 
 
presumably includes foreign universities and separately counts lawsuits over the same 
patented technology filed against different defendants. Andrew Chung, Schools that 
Sue: Why More Universities File Patent Lawsuits, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2015, 10:42 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/university-patents/schools-that-sue-why-
more-universities-file-patent-lawsuits-idUSL1N11G2C820150915 [https://perma.cc/ 
8KUE-LJ24]. 
 73. See Ouellette, supra note 71. To sue in its own name without joining the 
patent owner, an exclusive licensee must possess “all substantial rights” to a patent 
such that it “may be deemed the effective ‘patentee.’” Luminara Worldwide, L.L.C. 
v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Prima Tek II v. 
A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). There is no list of which rights 
constitute “all substantial rights,” but “the right to sue for infringement is critical.” Id. 
at 1350. 
 74. See Ouellette, supra note 71. 
 75. Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement 
Litigation, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 650–52 (2011). 
 76. Id. at abstract. 
 77. See generally Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions 
Between Universities and Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312 
(2013) [hereinafter Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation]; Jacob H. Rooksby, When 
Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University Patent Enforcement, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 169 (2013). For earlier interview work, see Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, 
The Effects of Patent Litigation on University Licensing Efforts, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 739 (2007). 
 78. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation, supra note 77, at 352–53. 
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licensing demands from universities that ultimately led to patent 
licenses.79 They also found that the licenses negotiated in response to 
these unsolicited demands were rarely accompanied by technology 
transfer, whether measured by creation of new products or features, 
transfers of technical knowledge or personnel, or creation of joint 
ventures.80 
II. HOW DO PATENTS AFFECT EX POST COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
UNIVERSITY-DEVELOPED INVENTIONS? 
The primary justification for patents on publicly funded 
inventions has been that they promote commercialization of 
technologies that would otherwise go unused.81 The idea that Bayh–
Dole patents incentivize the development of neglected inventions is 
reflected in the statutory text82 and legislative history,83 and has been 
noted by the Supreme Court84 and the Federal Circuit.85 As 
summarized by a Congressional Research Service report, when the 
Bayh–Dole Act was being considered, “it was widely argued that 
 
 79. Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean 
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 154 (2015). 
 80. See id. at 161–66; see also Robin C. Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, The 
Sound and Fury of Patent Activity, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1793, 1836–39 (2019) 
(reporting similar results from a broader study). 
 81. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1669 (“[A]dvocates of private appropriation 
of the results of government-sponsored research . . . shift the focus from the initial 
costs of making an invention to the subsequent costs of developing an existing 
invention into a commercial product.”); see, e.g., Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh–
Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155 (2006) 
(defending Bayh–Dole on the basis of this commercialization theory). 
 82. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2018) (“It is the policy and objective of the 
Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from 
federally supported research or development . . . .”). 
 83. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980) (describing the Act as 
creating “a single, uniform national policy designed to cut down on bureaucracy and 
encourage private industry to utilize government funded inventions through the 
commitment of the risk capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of 
commercial application”); see also 124 CONG. REC. 29,122 (1978) (statement of Sen. 
Bayh) (expressing concern about the “[h]undreds of valuable medical, energy, and 
other technological discoveries” that were “sitting unused”). 
 84. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
563 U.S. 776, 782 (2011) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 200) (“In 1980, Congress passed the 
Bayh–Dole Act to ‘promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research’ . . . .”). 
 85. In re Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 516 F.3d 1003, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“The purpose of the Bayh–Dole Act is as an incentive, not a bar, to university-
industry collaboration and commercial development through licensing . . . .”). 
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without title (or at least an exclusive license) to an invention and the 
protection it conveys, a company would not invest the additional, and 
often substantial[,] time and money necessary to commercialize a 
product or process for the marketplace.”86  
In a 2002 paean to Bayh–Dole, The Economist painted a dreary 
picture of the world before 1980:  
[I]nventions and discoveries made in American universities, teaching 
hospitals, national laboratories and non-profit institutions sat in warehouses 
gathering dust. Of the 28,000 patents that the American government owned 
in 1980, fewer than 5% had been licensed to industry. Although taxpayers 
were footing the bill for 60% of all academic research, they were getting 
hardly anything in return.87 
But then came “the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in 
America over the past half-century”: the Bayh–Dole Act, which 
“unlocked all the inventions and discoveries” that had been gathering 
dust and turned universities into “hotbeds of innovation” that generate 
patents, spin-offs, jobs, and billions of dollars for the U.S. economy.88 
The licensors of academic patents have been estimated to contribute 
hundreds of billions of dollars to U.S. GDP and millions of person-
years of employment from 1996 to 2015.89 
This compelling picture, however, is only part of the Bayh–Dole 
story. As Bhaven Sampat has explained, “in most industries patents 
are a relatively unimportant channel” through which university 
research is transferred to industry.90 Patent licenses may be salient and 
easily quantifiable, but they are not the only measure of whether the 
public is getting anything in return for its direct support of R&D—
many technologies based on federal funding have entered the 
marketplace without patents, both before and after Bayh–Dole.91 
Indeed, the idea of using non-IP incentives (grants) to spur creation of 
 
 86. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BAYH–DOLE ACT: 
SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 2 
(2012). 
 87. Opinion, Innovation’s Golden Goose, ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 14, 
2002, http://www.economist.com/science/tq/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1476653 
[https://perma.cc/CWJ5-NBZN]. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1702, points out serious 
selection effects in this data. 
 88. See Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 87. 
 89. BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG. & AUTM, THE ECONOMIC 
CONTRIBUTION OF UNIVERSITY/NONPROFIT INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1996–
2015 3 (2017). 
 90. See Sampat, supra note 10, at 773. 
 91. See id.; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 60 (listing 
mechanisms for knowledge transfer). 
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a new knowledge good and then choosing to allocate access to that 
good through IP rather than an open access regime may initially seem 
odd. IP creates allocative inefficiency—the deadweight loss of 
proprietary pricing that affects both end-users and subsequent 
innovators—so why would society choose to incur that cost when it is 
not necessary to incentivize production of the good in the first place?92 
The answer depends on the specific technology at issue. There 
are two general mechanisms through which an IP-based allocation 
regime for publicly funded inventions may lead to more efficient 
utilization of those inventions than open access. First, as discussed in 
Section II.A, the knowledge good may be useful primarily as an input 
for production of a follow-on knowledge good that requires substantial 
investment. For example, knowledge that a particular compound 
seems effective against HIV in an in vitro cell line is not terribly useful 
until someone takes the subsequent step of determining whether the 
compound is safe and effective for use in humans. A patent on the 
initial knowledge good that covers the follow-on use is one way to 
incentivize the later stages of development. 
Second, as discussed in Section II.B, the knowledge good may 
be more useful when its original creators are involved in its 
dissemination. For example, if the invention depends on some 
laboratory technique that is difficult to explain in writing and best 
conveyed person-to-person, a patent on the initial knowledge good 
may help encourage this tacit knowledge transfer. 
A. Exclusivity as a Commercialization Incentive 
When might exclusivity itself be necessary for 
commercialization? The clearest example is pharmaceuticals: If no 
one were permitted to patent a promising HIV treatment discovered 
by an NIH-funded researcher at Duke University, it is unlikely that 
any pharmaceutical firm would conduct the expensive clinical trials 
necessary to gain approval from the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).93 Just how expensive those clinical trials are is vigorously 
 
 92. See Hemel & Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, supra note 19, at 
567 (describing how Bayh–Dole produces this “matching” between non-IP innovation 
incentives and IP-based allocation mechanisms). 
 93. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545 (2009) (“[P]harmaceutical companies 
systematically screen their drug candidates to exclude the ones lacking strong patent 
protection . . . .”). 
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disputed,94 but they are costly enough that for-profit firms invest in 
drugs that are expected to have lengthy remaining patent protection 
once they are brought to market.95 But because Duke was able to patent 
the novel compound (enfuvirtide, marketed as Fuzeon), it could grant 
an exclusive license to the pharmaceutical firm Roche, which then 
gave Roche enough financial incentive to bring the drug to market.96  
Of course, granting exclusive patent licenses to for-profit firms 
and then paying the patent “shadow tax”97 on resulting products is not 
the only way to fund drug development. Roche and other firms that 
commercialize university inventions also benefit significantly from 
nonpatent incentives such as regulatory exclusivity, tax preferences, 
and direct federal grants,98 and these could be increased. Additionally, 
numerous scholars—including one of us—have questioned why the 
government does not directly fund more clinical trials.99 But given 
 
 94. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make 
a Drug?, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 302, nn.10–12 (2010) 
[hereinafter Ouellette, How Many Patents] (citing figures ranging from under $100 
million to over $1 billion). A recent study of fifty-nine new drugs approved by the 
FDA in 2015 and 2016 estimated a median clinical trial direct cost of $19 million, 
ranging from less than $5 million for three orphan drugs tested without a control to a 
high of almost $350 million. Thomas J. Moore et al., Estimated Costs of Pivotal Trials 
for Novel Therapeutic Agents Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration, 
2015-2016, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1451, 1451 (2018). But this direct cost does 
not account for the high risk of failure or the opportunity cost of the investment. 
 95. See Roin, supra note 93 (explaining that pharmaceutical companies drop 
drugs that lack strong patent protection from their development pipelines). See 
generally Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest 
in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 
2044 (2015) (showing a distortion in R&D away from drugs with shorter effective 
patent life). 
 96. See Ouellette, How Many Patents, supra note 94, at 332 (providing the 
patent information for Fuzeon); see also Betsy de Parry, Why Bipartisanship Matters, 
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/11/03/why-
bipartisanship-matters/ [https://perma.cc/2FD8-3G6X] (“[N]early 200 . . . drugs are 
available today as a result of . . . a little-known bill that laid the foundation for the 
development of therapies that have saved—literally—millions of lives . . . . That bill 
became known as the Bayh–Dole Act.”). 
 97. See Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, supra note 
19, at 312, 371–72 (explaining that the “shadow tax” is a cost borne by consumers 
and taxpayers).  
 98. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and 
Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015) [hereinafter 
Ouellette, Nonpatent Innovation Incentives] (providing an overview of these 
incentives). 
 99. Hemel & Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, supra note 19, at 570–
71 (“One might think that the federal government would have an advantage over 
private industry in bringing new pharmaceutical products to market, given its unique 
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existing institutional structures and incentives, if a university were 
unable to patent a promising drug candidate, it seems unlikely that the 
drug would be developed. With the ability to use patents to transfer 
drugs to industry, universities are playing a significant role in the drug-
development pipeline, with one study suggesting that they are 
responsible for about a third of the most innovative new drugs.100 
Exclusivity may be important for pharmaceutical development, 
but it is not necessary for commercialization of all university 
inventions, as evidenced by the fact that over 60% of patent licenses 
reported by universities are nonexclusive.101 To be sure, if each 
nonexclusively licensed invention involves a large number of licenses, 
the fraction of patented inventions that are nonexclusively licensed 
may be far smaller. And as noted by Hemel and Ouellette, “one should 
be cautious about inferring that all nonexclusive licenses have no 
commercialization value: for instance, universities might maximize 
profits through cartel rather than monopoly arrangements,”102 though 
we do not know of universities that have adopted this strategy. At the 
very least, the prevalence of nonexclusive licenses raises questions 
 
ability to raise capital and especially given that the challenge of bringing a new drug 
to market largely involves navigating federal regulations . . . . [T]he public sector 
would [outperform] the private sector on these dimensions if the government 
committed itself to a more active role in development and commercialization.”). 
 100. See Robert Kneller, The Importance of New Companies for Drug 
Discovery: Origins of a Decade of New Drugs, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 
867, 869 tbl.1 (2010) (focusing on all drugs coming out of universities, including ones 
based on industry funding, and reporting that of drugs approved 1998 to 2007, 
including biologics, universities discovered 30% of “priority review” drugs—for 
“drugs that are anticipated to provide substantial benefit over currently marketed 
drugs”—and 31% of “scientifically novel” drugs); see also Bhaven N. Sampat & 
Frank R. Lichtenberg, What Are the Respective Roles of the Public and Private 
Sectors in Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 334–35 (2011) 
(focusing on federally funded drugs and reporting that 17% of priority review drugs 
approved 1988 to 2005 had a patent assigned to the government or acknowledging 
government support).  
 101. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, at 275 n.16 (citing AUTM SURVEY, 
supra note 28); see also Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1710 (“[N]onexclusive licenses 
do little or nothing to give licensees an advantage over their competitors and thus are 
unlikely to enhance the profitability of product development.”). 
 102. See Hemel & Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 
289–90; id. at 290 n.46 (“[I]f a licensee firm thinks a university is profit maximizing, 
it might accept a nonexclusive license for a percentage of its profits on the condition 
that the university demand the same percentage from any future licensee. A purely 
profit-motivated university would have an incentive to grant a second non-exclusive 
license only if the first firm turns out to be bad at commercializing the invention 
(because a fixed percentage of monopoly profits is greater than that same percentage 
of duopoly profits).”). 
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about the applicability of commercialization theory across all 
technology classes.103  
Exclusivity does not seem to have been needed for 
commercialization of a number of high-profile university inventions. 
For example, Stanford’s Cohen–Boyer patents on early recombinant 
DNA technology and Columbia’s Axel patents on a method for 
inserting foreign DNA into cells were platform technologies that were 
foundational for the U.S. biotechnology industry.104 They were widely 
and nonexclusively licensed, bringing in $255 million to Stanford and 
$790 million to Columbia.105 We will return in Part IV to whether this 
revenue helps provide an additional justification for university 
patenting, but it seems hard to argue that these biotech techniques 
would not have been adopted by industry if they had not been 
patented.106 
Another example from the biosciences may be genetic 
diagnostic tests, raising questions about whether the added incentive 
needed for pharmaceutical commercialization is applicable to 
overcoming lower regulatory hurdles.107 A request by the Department 
of Health and Human Services found that for none of the ten genetic 
tests studied—including the breast cancer gene tests patented by 
Myriad Genetics—“was the test developed by the exclusive rights 
holder the first to market.”108 Although diagnostics are increasingly 
 
 103. For similar critiques of the commercialization justification for university 
patents, see Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property—When Is It the Best Incentive 
Mechanism for S&T Data and Information?, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 15, 18 (Julie M. Esanu & 
Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003); Lemley, supra note 25, at 624; Rai, supra note 26, at 120, 
135; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 300; Sampat, supra note 10, at 786. For a 
critique of commercialization theories as a justification of lawsuits and licensing 
demands from non-practicing entities, see Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Is 
Patent Enforcement Efficient?, 98 B.U. L. REV. 649, 656–57 (2018). 
 104. See Alessandra Colaianni & Robert Cook-Deegan, Columbia 
University’s Axel Patents: Technology Transfer and Implications for the Bayh–Dole 
Act, 87 MILBANK Q. 683, 685–86 (2009); see also Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, 
at 275. 
 105. Colaianni & Cook-Deegan, supra note 104, at 684–85; see also Leute, 
supra note 44, at 221. 
 106. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1710 (“[I]t can hardly be argued that the 
patents have done anything to promote product development that would not have 
occurred if the patented technology had instead been placed in the public domain.”). 
 107. On the lower hurdles for diagnostics than therapeutics, see Ouellette, 
Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, supra note 98, at 1129, 1136–37. 
 108. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 31 n.82 (2010); see also Hemel 
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difficult to patent,109 it is not clear whether this is creating problems 
outside the university context,110 and the case for patents is less 
convincing when the early stages of the research have already been 
funded by grants. 
It is also difficult to square commercialization theory with 
assertion of patents in litigation against successful products that have 
incorporated the patented technology without a license, or with 
outsourcing this function to patent-assertion entities. For example, 
Boston University’s successful patent suit against large technology 
companies for its patent on blue LEDs may have brought in significant 
income for the university,111 but the widespread adoption of this 
technology without exclusivity indicates that exclusivity was not 
necessary to make blue LEDs publicly available. Rather, like the 
Cohen–Boyer and Axel nonexclusive licenses, this kind of litigation 
seems to impose a tax on users (including both end-users and 
subsequent innovators) that cannot be justified for its 
commercialization benefit.112 Similarly, an analysis of university 
software patent lawsuits filed by 2006 found “a number of lawsuits in 
which university software patents have been used not for purposes of 
fostering commercialization, but instead to extract rents in apparent 
holdup litigation.”113 
Ayres and Ouellette have argued that if the benefit of exclusivity 
for commercialization is the only compelling justification for Bayh–
Dole patents, then “a nonexclusive license is prima facie evidence that 
 
& Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 290–91 (noting that the 
breast cancer gene patent that was invalidated by Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013), was jointly owned by Myriad, the University 
of Utah, and the United States and was funded by the NIH and the National Institute 
of Environmental Health Sciences). 
 109. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 
F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding the testing processes at issue to be patent 
ineligible); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 257 (2015) (discussing the patent-ineligibility of advances in 
diagnostic medicine and its implications). 
 110. See Colleen Chien & Arti K. Rai, An Empirical Analysis of Diagnostic 
Patenting Post-Mayo (unpublished manuscript). 
 111. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 112. For an explanation of how patents act as a “shadow tax” on patented 
products, see Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, supra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
 113. See Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University 
Software Ownership and Litigation: A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1519 
(2009). 
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the invention ought not to have been patented at all.”114 More 
generally, federally funded inventions that are patented should be 
subject to a “market test”: 
Before charging significant licensing fees for these inventions, these federal 
grant recipients would first be required to find out whether firms would be 
willing to commercialize the invention in exchange for a nonexclusive 
license with a nominal fee. If a company is willing to commit to developing 
the invention under a nonexclusive license, then an exclusive license—or a 
nonexclusive license with high fees—would be contrary to the public 
interest. More generally, using a formal economic model, we show that 
deadweight loss can be reduced through an auction that forces bidders to 
reveal the least amount of exclusivity needed to induce commercialization, 
that revenue cap bidding is more efficient than duration bidding, and that 
defensive bidding by firms that consume as well as produce the invention 
will not increase deadweight loss.115 
Ayres and Ouellette did not claim that the commercialization 
benefit of exclusivity is the only compelling justification for Bayh–
Dole patents. Rather, the goal was, “[b]y showing that it would not be 
infeasible to limit Bayh–Dole patents to those areas in which they are 
actually needed for commercialization, . . . to shift the burden to 
Bayh–Dole defenders to develop stronger theoretical and empirical 
accounts of why patents should be allowed in other cases.”116 In other 
words, because commercialization theory does not justify the present 
scope of university patenting practices, either other theories must be 
developed, or the Bayh–Dole Act should be curtailed. In the remainder 
of this Article, we examine what evidence exists to support alternative 
benefits. 
B. Patent Rewards as an Incentive for Inventor Involvement and Tacit 
Knowledge Transfer 
Even if market exclusivity itself is not necessary for 
commercialization, patents may still facilitate development of 
university inventions if they provide an incentive for university 
inventors to be directly involved in commercialization and if this 
personal involvement leads to more efficient use. This mechanism 
seems most important for inventions that depend heavily on tacit 
knowledge, or knowledge that is conveyed more easily in person than 
 
 114. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, at 276. 
 115. Id. at 271–72. 
 116. Id. at 280. 
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in writing.117 It may also be important for simply encouraging 
inventors to comply with the formalities of disclosing inventions and 
help TTOs with prosecution. However, as discussed in this Section, 
not all licensees need tacit knowledge transfer for successful 
commercialization, and patent licensing contracts are not the only 
mechanism for incentivizing inventor involvement. Other types of 
incentives may enable tacit knowledge transfer at a lower cost. 
Additionally, the benefits of tacit knowledge transfer must be weighed 
against the opportunity cost of taking inventors away from other 
efforts. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 
Bayh–Dole Act noted the benefit of inventor involvement, reporting 
that among witnesses testifying before the committee, “[v]irtually all 
experts in the innovation process stress very strongly that . . . 
involvement by the inventor is absolutely essential [for further 
development], especially when the invention was made under basic 
research where it is invariably in the embryonic stage of 
development.”118 In support of Bayh–Dole, witnesses explained to the 
committee that “when Government agencies retain title to inventions 
made by nonprofit organizations or small business contractors there is 
no incentive for the inventor to remain involved in the possible 
development of the patentable discovery.”119  
Because codifying knowledge is costly, university inventors 
have a great deal of knowledge that is not captured in patents or 
publications. As Ajay Agrawal has explained, knowledge does not fall 
into binary categories of codified or tacit: much of the uncodified 
knowledge university inventors have may be codifiable, but at some 
cost.120  
 
 117. Others define tacit knowledge as not codifiable and not contractible, as 
“that knowledge that requires repeated or prolonged interaction between two people 
to exchange.” Robert A. Lowe, Who Develops a University Invention? The Impact of 
Tacit Knowledge and Licensing Policies, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 415, 427 (2006). In 
light of later theoretical and empirical work on consulting arrangements and other 
knowledge transfer provisions in licensing contracts, it seems accurate to describe this 
knowledge as having a high cost to codify. 
 118. S. REP. No. 96-480, at 22 (1979). 
 119. Id.  
 120. See Ajay Agrawal, Engaging the Inventor: Exploring Licensing 
Strategies for University Inventions and the Role of Latent Knowledge, 27 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 63, 64 (2006); see also Lynne G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby & Jeff S. 
Armstrong, Commercializing Knowledge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, 
and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, 48 MGMT. SCI. 138, 140 (2002); James E. 
Bessen, From Knowledge to Ideas: The Two Faces of Innovation (Boston Univ. Sch. 
L., Working Paper No. 10-35, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698802 (showing 
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Additionally, only certain knowledge is considered patentable or 
publishable.121 For example, failed experiments are codifiable and may 
be valuable for preventing redundant work but are typically not 
published.122 While a great deal of information could be disclosed in a 
patent, the disclosure requirement does not legally require it, and 
codification by a patent attorney in a patent is both costly and 
sometimes not the most effective way to communicate.123 Uncodified-
but-codifiable “latent knowledge”124 may also include “heuristics, 
rules of thumb, and other ‘tricks of the trade’” the inventor learns by 
trial and error;125 “intuition regarding how the invention might behave 
under alternate circumstances;”126 and background knowledge from 
“disparate fields” that the inventor has learned “on an as-needed 
basis.”127 The fact that university inventions are typically “embryonic” 
at the time of disclosure and licensing128 suggests the associated 
knowledge is not yet codified, and that a university patent alone will 
rarely convey all the inventor’s knowledge relevant to development 
 
communication costs are endogenous and the cost of codification can explain 
distribution in patenting across different firm sizes and geographic regions).  
 121. See Agrawal, supra note 120, at 64. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, 
Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1503, 1519–20 (2012) (summarizing scholarly commentary on limitations of 
patent disclosures). 
 124. Agrawal, supra note 120, at 64. 
 125. Ashish Arora, Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Market for Know-How, 4 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 41, 42 (1995). 
 126. Agrawal, supra note 120, at 64. 
 127. Id. at 65. 
 128. See Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: 
The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 243 (2001) 
(surveying TTO managers about their 1991–95 licensing activities); Jerry G. Thursby 
& Marie C. Thursby, Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University–Industry 
Licensing, 22 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y, 162, 167 (2004) (surveying firms about their 
1993–97 licensing activity with universities). 
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and commercialization.129 Engaging the inventor directly is the most 
obvious way for a firm to capture this tacit knowledge.130 
Inventor involvement with a licensee has been associated with 
various metrics of commercial success across technological fields,131 
although these studies have not isolated the causal effect of inventor 
involvement or whether the benefits outweigh the costs for inventors 
or for licensees. In mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and 
computer science at MIT, Agrawal found a positive and statistically 
significant association between inventor engagement, measured by 
hours of collaboration, and both whether a product based on the 
licensed invention is sold and the average annual royalty payments 
over the duration of the license agreement.132 Lynne Zucker and her 
coauthors found biotechnology firms that collaborate with academics, 
as measured by coauthorship with the firm’s scientists, have more 
 
 129. Most scholars point to the embryonic nature of disclosed inventions as 
evidence of more tacit knowledge, pointing out that knowledge is tacit when it is first 
produced and eventually becomes codified. See Agrawal, supra note 120, at 64; 
Zucker, supra note 120, at 140; Richard A. Jensen, University–Industry Linkages in 
the Support of Biotechnology Discoveries, ANN. REV. RESOURCE. ECON., 377, 380 
(2016). Others, however, describe tacit knowledge as know-how that accumulates 
over time, which might therefore be more abundant for more fully developed 
technologies. See Arora, supra note 125, at 42. Still others suggest that the importance 
of tacit knowledge is greater for more complex technologies, rather than newer 
technologies. See Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Alfons Palangkaraya & Elizabeth Webster, 
Why Do Patents Facilitate Trade in Technology? Testing the Disclosure and 
Appropriation Effects, 45 RES. POL’Y 1326, 1372 (2016). 
 130. Agrawal points to four reasons engaging the inventor in tacit knowledge 
transfer is useful for commercialization: the inventor (1) can often codify non-codified 
knowledge with appropriate incentives; (2) has mastered the complex bodies of 
knowledge needed to use the invention; (3) has intuition about how the invention will 
behave in different circumstances; and (4) can provide knowledge on an as-needed 
basis rather than requiring the licensee to predict product development in advance. 
See Agrawal, supra note 120, at 65. 
 131. Though this effect has been documented across fields, payoffs from 
commercial activities and opportunity costs of time spent away from research vary 
across disciplines. See Wesley M. Cohen, Henry Sauermann & Paula Stephan, Not in 
the Job Description: The Commercial Activities of Academic Scientists and 
Engineers, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming 2020), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3535. 
These differences affect the level of incentives necessary to induce inventor 
involvement under models such as in Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 241. 
 132. See Agrawal, supra note 120, at 75. Agrawal disposes of the possibility 
that inventors are scaling their involvement based on likelihood of commercial 
success. However, Agrawal does not address firms’ criteria for involving inventors 
and does not include a measure of tacit knowledge or otherwise prove it is the causal 
mechanism. See id. at 65. 
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products in development and on the market.133 In interviews and case 
studies, university inventors, licensees, and TTOs explain that they 
view inventor involvement as important for development and 
commercialization.134 Outside the university context, licenses 
requiring the licensor to provide technical assistance are associated 
with more subsequent patenting.135 The effect is diminished for 
licensees that already have patents in the relevant subject area, for 
whom tacit knowledge transfer is presumably less important.136  
The economics literature has framed inventor involvement as a 
moral hazard problem, in which incentives linked to 
commercialization success are necessary to ensure the inventor 
devotes sufficient effort to the firm.137 Licensing agreements with 
royalties can provide such an incentive, as can licensing agreements 
with other “continuation payments” such as equity or milestone 
payments.138 Inventor involvement in tacit knowledge transfer may 
 
 133. See Lynne G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby & Jeff Armstrong, 
Geographically Localized Knowledge: Spillovers or Markets?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 65, 
81 (1998); Zucker, supra note 120, at 140 (discussing how firms that collaborate with 
successful academics produce more patents, with a higher citation rate per patent, than 
firms that do not). Neither study addresses the possibility that more promising firms 
are able to attract star scientists at a higher rate. 
 134. See Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 243 (finding TTO managers 
believe 71% of licensed inventions require cooperation by the inventor for further 
development); Thursby & Thursby, supra note 128, at 170 (finding that “[f]aculty 
have specialized knowledge” is the most common reason firms give that faculty input 
is considered important for further development of a technology). 
 135. See Maria Isabella Leone et al., License to Learn: An Investigation into 
Thin and Thick Licensing Contracts, 46 R&D MGMT. 326, 332 (2016). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See, e.g., Emmanuel Dechenaux, Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, 
Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The Role of Contracts, 40 RES. POL’Y 
94 (2011); Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 246–47.  
 138. Based on a theoretical model, Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby show 
equity induces inventor effort more efficiently than a royalty because an equity share 
does not decrease the profit-maximizing output level. See Jensen & Thursby, supra 
note 128, at 246, 251–52. A survey of Harvard’s license agreements found, however, 
that the inclusion of equity provisions was associated with a higher rate of contract 
termination. See Daniel W. Elfenbein, Contract Structure and Performance of 
University-Industry Technology Transfer Agreements 19 (July 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452717. Elfenbein accounts for the 
possibility of endogenous matching by showing that large and small licensees use 
equity at similar rates. See id. at 24. Milestone payments create less deadweight loss 
than royalties and are viewed as important when faculty involvement is critical, but 
university license agreements commonly include royalties as well as milestone 
payments, perhaps because a risk-averse firm will prefer to include royalties to shield 
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also be induced by license agreements providing for corporate-
sponsored research or consulting arrangements.139 For inventions that 
require significant tacit knowledge transfer for commercialization, 
inventor-owned startups may be the most effective mechanism.140 But 
the value of these different structures for facilitating inventor 
involvement has primarily been studied through theoretical modeling; 
empirical evidence supporting the existence of a moral hazard 
problem is scant and outdated.141 
Additionally, although license agreements provide a tractable 
scaffold for tacit-knowledge-transfer arrangements, tacit knowledge 
transfer also occurs outside patent channels. A consulting arrangement 
itself may serve as a non-patent form of exclusivity.142 The consulting 
arrangement could be exclusive by its terms, or it could be exclusive 
in practice, given inventors’ reluctance to spend time away from 
academic research to transfer tacit knowledge to multiple firms. Firms 
relying on consulting for exclusivity, though, may be reluctant to 
disclose advances in publications, which runs counter to norms of 
open science.143 Where inventions are patented, just as nonexclusive 
licenses are prima facie evidence that exclusivity is not necessary for 
 
itself from the risk the invention will be a technical success but a commercial failure. 
See Dechenaux, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 137, at 98–100. 
 139. For economic models, see Dechenaux, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 
137, at 98; Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 252; and Inés Macho‐Stadler, David 
Pérez-Castrillo & Reinhilde Veugelers, Designing Contracts for University Spin-Offs, 
17 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 185 (2008). 
 140. See Lowe, supra note 117, at 415–18 (developing a theoretical model of 
how inventor know-how might affect an inventor’s decision to license an invention or 
create a start-up). 
 141. See Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for 
University Inventions, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 689 (2007) (“While it is clear 
that a scientist’s time is a scarce input in the production function that generates both 
of these economically desirable outputs, the empirical research has found little 
evidence that commercialization activity and scientific research are substitutes in the 
statistical sense; rather, these outputs seem to be highly correlated even after 
controlling for a number of factors.”). But see Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 
248 (“[I]n many cases TTO managers said one of their major challenges is getting 
productive research faculty to disclose and continue to develop inventions beyond the 
proof of concept stage.”). 
 142. See Lee, supra note 123, at 1570 (describing tacit knowledge as naturally 
excludable); Emily Michiko Morris, The Many Faces of Bayh–Dole, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 
81, 123 (2016); Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: 
Inventions of Methods of Inventing and Firm Entry in Nanotechnology 4, 17 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9825, 2003). 
 143. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms 
of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) (explaining how 
proprietary rights are counter to scientific norms). 
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commercialization, licenses to more than a few firms are prima facie 
evidence that inventor involvement is not necessary for 
commercialization. 
Tacit knowledge transfer can also occur without any formal 
incentives or agreements. Ajay Agrawal and Rebecca Henderson 
found that faculty members at MIT perceive informal knowledge 
channels (conferences, co-supervision, recruitment, and 
conversations) to have about as much influence on industry activities 
as formal channels of tacit knowledge transfer (consulting, 
collaborative research), and more influence than codified knowledge 
(publications, patents and licenses).144  
There is little doubt that inventors can facilitate 
commercialization of their inventions, but we have not located any 
convincing evidence on the causal effect of patents and license 
agreements to induce their cooperation. Continuation payments are 
common, as moral hazard models predict. Even in the absence of 
moral hazard, though, firms may prefer to use continuation payments 
because the value of the invention is too uncertain at the time of 
licensing to use up-front payments.145 The embryonic nature of 
university inventions is an essential premise of the tacit-knowledge-
transfer justification for university patenting, but the primary evidence 
for the development stage of university inventions is survey data from 
the early 1990s.146 Validation of moral hazard models with more recent 
data is warranted, especially in light of the fact that many TTOs 
reorganized in the 1990s,147 and the use of different types of 
continuation payments fluctuated during that period.148 The Internet 
and ease of travel have made tacit knowledge transfer faster and 
cheaper, while the Internet has also reduced the cost of codification 
for knowledge not publishable in scientific journals. These changes 
raise questions about whether patents and license agreements are 
 
 144. See Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: 
Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 44, 53 (2002); Wesley M. 
Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of 
Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 171, 171–87 
(Roger G. Noll ed., 1998). 
 145. See Jerry G. Thursby, Richard Jensen & Marie C. Thursby, Objectives, 
Characteristics and Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. 
Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, 64 (2001). 
 146. See Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 242. 
 147. See Thursby, Jensen & Thursby, supra note 145, at 60. 
 148. See Jensen & Thursby, supra note 128, at 246; see also Elfenbein, supra 
note 138, at 15. 
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necessary or cost-effective as a means of promoting tacit knowledge 
transfer. 
III. WHAT EX ANTE EFFECT DO PATENT INCENTIVES HAVE ON THE 
QUANTITY, QUALITY, OR DIRECTION OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH? 
As summarized by Mark Lemley, “[t]he standard justification 
for intellectual property is ex ante . . . . It is the prospect of the 
intellectual property right that spurs creative incentives.”149 And the 
Bayh–Dole framework does provide incentives for university 
inventors. By statute, government-funded researchers must receive a 
percentage of patent royalties from their inventions: the Bayh–Dole 
Act requires that agreements between the government funding agency 
and a contracting university or other nonprofit include “a requirement 
that the contractor share royalties with the inventor.”150 Inventors may 
also receive preference in using the patent to create a start-up.151 One 
might thus expect this added financial incentive to increase the quality 
or quantity of research produced ex ante by university researchers. 
Legal scholars generally have dismissed this incentive effect in 
the university context, arguing that the public already bears the fixed 
costs of grant-funded research, and that patents inefficiently force 
taxpayers to “pay twice” for the resulting knowledge goods.152 
 
 149. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004). 
 150. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2017). The relevant standard contract language 
is: 
(2) The contractor will share royalties collected on a subject invention with 
the inventor, including Federal employee co-inventors (when the agency 
deems it appropriate) when the subject invention is assigned in accordance 
with 35 U.S.C. 202(e) and 37 CFR 401.10;  
(3) The balance of any royalties or income earned by the contractor with 
respect to subject inventions, after payment of expenses (including 
payments to inventors) incidental to the administration of subject 
inventions, will be utilized for the support of scientific research or education 
. . . . 
37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k) (2018) (emphasis added). Note that the Bayh–Dole Act does 
not specify a particular royalty share for university and nonprofit researchers. In 
contrast, the Stevenson–Wydler Act specifies that inventors at government 
laboratories receive the first $2,000 of royalties each year plus 15% of any additional 
royalties. 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2018). 
 151. See supra Section I.B. 
 152. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts 
on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2000); 
see also Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1666; cf. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 796 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
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Moreover, university researchers have other motivations to innovate, 
including the desire for tenure and prestige.153 The net incentive effect 
of Bayh–Dole patents on researchers could even be negative if, for 
example, the financial rewards reduce intrinsic motivations154 or cause 
researchers to shift their research focus away from more socially 
valuable but unpatentable research. 
But the potential incentive benefit of Bayh–Dole patents for 
researchers cannot easily be dismissed as a matter of theory. The 
patent incentive may help encourage researchers to stay in academia 
rather than shifting to industry research or to fields like finance that 
value quantitative skills. It may provide added incentive to produce 
more or better research, especially for faculty who have already 
satisfied the requirements for tenure. And if it causes a shift in research 
focus, that shift may well be toward more socially valuable work. 
Thus, rather than forcing the public to “pay twice” for the same 
invention, Bayh–Dole may split the bill into ex post market-set patent 
rewards and ex ante government-set payments. And mixing these 
different innovation policy instruments may help direct research 
toward the projects with the most social benefit by tethering part of 
the payment to commercial success.155 
Patents are complex legal instruments, so it is worth 
disentangling the different influences that patents may have on 
academic researchers. We can identify at least three independent 
potential benefits that the prospect of patents may have for faculty 
researchers. First, and perhaps most obviously, patents can have a 
financial effect. The requirement that universities share patent 
royalties with inventors means that academic researchers can capture 
 
(arguing that there must be some compensating benefit of Bayh–Dole because 
otherwise, “[w]hy should the public have to pay twice for the same invention?”). For 
an analysis of this critique, see generally Rebecca E. Wolitz, The Pay-Twice Critique, 
Government Funding, and Reasonable Pricing Clauses, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (2019). 
 153. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1668; see also Lemley, supra note 
25, at 621; Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of 
University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. 
& TECH. 285, 318–19 (2014); Morris, supra note 142, at 87–88; Rai, supra note 26, 
at 119–20. 
 154. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92–98 (2006) (arguing that 
inventors are often motivated by “social-psychological rewards” and that extrinsic 
financial rewards may “crowd out” intrinsic motivations).  
 155. See Hemel & Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, supra note 19, at 
574–81, 596–99; see also Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 
supra note 19, at 303–04 (explaining why no one innovation policy is optimal in all 
circumstances). 
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a direct financial gain from patenting. Some researchers may also 
realize financial gain by founding university spin-offs based on their 
patents. 
Second, patents can have a reputational effect. Even if patents 
are never licensed or enforced and thus never generate any royalties, 
some inventors value the stamp of government approval saying that 
they had a novel and nonobvious idea, as well as the corresponding 
ability to claim the idea as “theirs”—especially if the invention is 
widely adopted.156 It is becoming more common for patents to be listed 
on a professor’s curriculum vitae and even to be considered in some 
tenure decisions.157 It is far from clear that patents—with their 
associated legal costs—are the best way (or even a good way) to serve 
these reputational values, but it is a function patents are sometimes 
serving in practice. 
Third, patents can have a social impact effect on adoption of an 
inventor’s technology. If patents in fact serve commercialization 
goals, the prospect of more widespread use of their research findings 
may have intrinsic benefits for faculty that enhance their ex ante 
incentives. Commercialization may, of course, also enhance the 
reputational rewards discussed above. But even if (counterfactually) 
university inventors could not be associated by name with their patents 
and received no financial benefit from them, the patents could still be 
used as legal instruments to promote (or perhaps inhibit) 
commercialization and widespread use of their technologies—which 
may be relevant to inventors who care about promoting the public 
good or the validation of their research, even without the ability to take 
credit for it. 
 
 156. See Jason Rantanen & Sarah E. Jack, Patents as Credentials, 76 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 311, 340 (2019); see also Clark Asay, Patent Schisms, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 45, 59–66 (2018) (explaining how these motivations may conflict with how the 
university uses the patents). See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in 
Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1759–60 (2012) (providing a framework 
for considering such expressive incentives). 
 157. See Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby Stuart, The Determinants of 
Faculty Patenting Behavior: Demographics or Opportunities?, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 599, 621 (2007); Ashley J. Stevens, Ginger A. Johnson & Paul R. Sanberg, 
The Role of Patents and Commercialization in the Tenure and Promotion Process, 13 
TECH. & INNOVATION 241 (2011). But see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents 
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 549 n.12 (2012) (surveying 
websites of fifty academic nanotechnology researchers and finding only one that listed 
patents, but arguing that patents should become documents that faculty are proud to 
list next to their publications). 
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As discussed in the following three Sections, the literature on 
how these effects impact university inventor behavior is mostly a 
series of null results or context-specific findings, making it difficult to 
draw strong conclusions about how patents affect academic research. 
And even if any of these three benefits did increase the quantity or 
quality of innovation at universities, these effects must be weighed 
against the potential costs of the patent incentive, such as shifting 
researchers’ focus away from the most socially valuable projects.  
A. Survey and Interview Evidence 
One approach to understanding how much these different 
benefits matter to university researchers is to ask them. For example, 
Jason Owen-Smith and Walter Powell interviewed 68 faculty in 
academic year 1999–2000 at two U.S. universities—an elite private 
school and a large state school—about their motivations for patenting 
(or not).158 Faculty perceptions of the benefits of patenting were 
similar at the two schools, and they reported a wide variety of 
motivations, including the desire to make money, increase their 
prestige, and benefit the public.159 But this result does not imply that 
U.S. researchers are sensitive to changes in royalty share. It is unclear 
how many interviewees mentioned each goal or how they weighed the 
different benefits. And at both schools, reported incentives varied 
across broad research fields; in general, physical scientists took a 
“relational” approach of using patents to develop relationships with 
multiple firms and as bargaining chips for access to proprietary 
technology, whereas life scientists took a “proprietary” approach that 
focused on finding the best partner for exclusively developing a 
technology.160 This unsurprising finding reflects the ways patents are 
used in different industries more broadly,161 and it is worth keeping in 
mind that conclusions based on academics in one field may not be 
generalizable. 
Other interview and survey work also shows that faculty 
researchers describe a variety of motivations for patenting, with 
financial incentives playing an important role only for a small fraction 
 
 158. See generally Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: 
Faculty Decisions and Institutional Success at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 99 (2001). 
 159. See id. at 105, 107. 
 160. See id. at 105–06. 
 161. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent 
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). 
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of researchers.162 For example, in 2002–2003, Catherine Renault asked 
faculty at 12 southeastern universities (39 interviews, 59 survey 
responses) to categorize their attitude on a five-point scale ranging 
from agreement with the traditional Mertonian ideal of free exchange 
of ideas (1) to support for academic capitalism (5), with roughly one-
fifth of the respondents placing themselves in each category.163 When 
asked about reasons for patenting, only those at the capitalist end of 
this attitude scale mentioned financial rewards—about 30% of “5”s 
and 10% of “4”s, reflecting only about 7% of the entire sample.164 
Those at the low end of the scale who patented were more likely to 
report pursuing that outcome because of the challenge (50% of 
“1”s).165 
Based on 36 interviews and 734 survey responses from 
academics in the United Kingdom in 2006–2007, Alice Lam found 
that faculty report “a diversity of motivations for commercial 
engagement.”166 Many respondents said they were motivated by 
“reputational and intrinsic reasons”; “financial rewards play[ed] a 
relatively small part.”167 When asked which of seven factors has 
motivated them to engage in commercial activities (including but not 
limited to patenting), only 27% reported that increasing personal 
income was an “important” or “very important” motivator (“3” or “4” 
on a four-point scale)—the lowest rating for any factor.168  
Most recently, in 2013, Brian Love analyzed survey responses 
from 269 faculty at the top twenty computer science and electrical 
 
 162. We focus here on studies that tried to determine researchers’ motivation 
for patenting, but there is a related literature showing that patenting is only a small 
fraction of the activity of typical academics. For example, in 1999, Ajay Agrawal and 
Rebecca Henderson interviewed MIT mechanical and electrical engineering faculty 
who were inventors on at least one patent, and these faculty reported that patents were 
a “relatively unimportant” means of transferring information out of the university. 
Agrawal & Henderson, supra note 144, at 50. They also found that most faculty never 
patented, publication rates greatly surpassed patent rates, and faculty estimated that 
patents accounted for less than 10% of the knowledge transfer from their laboratories. 
Id. at 44. 
 163. See Catherine Searle Renault, Academic Capitalism and University 
Incentives for Faculty Entrepreneurship, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 227, 233 (2006). 
 164. Id. at 235–36. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Alice Lam, What Motivates Academic Scientists To Engage in Research 
Commercialization: ‘Gold’, ‘Ribbon’ or ‘Puzzle’?, 40 RES. POL’Y 1354, 1354 (2011). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1356. 
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engineering departments at U.S. universities.169 Only about 10% of 
respondents reported that the prospect of obtaining patent rights 
encourages them to produce more or higher quality research, and they 
overwhelmingly ranked patents outside the top four factors motivating 
their work.170 Indeed, over 50% of patent holders were unaware of their 
university’s royalty-sharing policy.171 
These survey and interview results are informative about how 
faculty perceive their motivations, but one should be cautious before 
using them to inform public policy. Although people are somewhat 
reliable at reporting what they have done in the past, they are less 
accurate at explaining why they made past choices, or at predicting 
future choices.172 Respondents may perceive a stigma against 
expressing an interest in financial gain, particularly in academic 
environments that idealize Mertonian norms.173 To draw stronger 
conclusions, it is thus necessary to look to how people and firms 
actually behave under different policy regimes.  
B. Evidence from Patenting Behavior 
Despite faculty scientists’ general disavowal of financial 
motivations in the surveys canvassed above, their behavior indicates 
that they are, in fact, at least somewhat interested in money. For 
example, Paula Stephan reports that faculty “routinely move to take 
more lucrative-paying positions.”174 Also, professors generally use 
part of their research funds to pay their own summer salary, rather than 
leaving these funds for science.175 But this does not mean that the 
 
 169. Love, supra note 153, at 286. The respondents were highly representative 
of the target population with respect to observable characteristics, including being 
named as an inventor on at least one university patent (54% of respondents vs. 52% 
of targets). Id. at 299–300. 
 170. Id. at 315–16. 
 171. Id. at 317. 
 172. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What 
They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 67, 68 (2001); 
John A. List, Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation 
Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1498, 
1504 (2001). 
 173. See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973) 
(discussing scientific norms generally); Robert K. Merton, Priorities in Scientific 
Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 635, 639 (1957) 
(discussing historical trends in scientific disputes over priority of discovery). 
 174. PAULA STEPHAN, HOW ECONOMICS SHAPES SCIENCE 3 (2012). 
 175. See BURROUGHS WELLCOME FUND & HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., 
MAKING THE RIGHT MOVES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT FOR 
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financial incentive from patents matters—for most professors, the 
ability to maintain a steady stream of grants to pay summer salary each 
year is likely a more immediate financial concern than speculative 
patent royalties. 
Moreover, as noted above, the net effect of the patent incentive 
may be a private gain for university researchers but a social welfare 
loss.176 Arti Rai has described early critics of the Bayh–Dole Act who 
“extolled the virtues of traditional scientific norms and argued that the 
intrusion of property rights would thwart the success of scientific 
research by inhibiting further work in areas that had been removed 
from the communal domain.”177 Here, we are focused not on the 
impact that other patents might have on scientists as users of 
knowledge goods and the debate about an “anticommons” in basic 
research;178 rather, we are interested in the effect that the prospect of 
their own patents might have on faculty’s research, including their 
willingness to engage openly with other scientists. Margo Bagley has 
raised related concerns about patents creating incentives for 
academics to keep results secret or delay their disclosure.179 There is 
some empirical support for this concern about delay,180 but patents do 
not appear to be substituting for publications; rather, the consistent 
finding in the literature is that publications and academic patents are 
 
POSTDOCS AND NEW FACULTY 20 (2d ed. 2006); see also STEPHAN, supra note 174, at 
43 (“Most academic scientists in the United States are hired on nine-to ten-month 
contracts. It is the grant that pays for their summer, not the institution.”). 
 176. See BENKLER, supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 177. Rai, supra note 26, at 109. It is not clear, however, that these problems 
materialized. NAT’L. RES. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 3 (“The Bayh-Dole legal 
framework and the practices of universities have not seriously undermined academic 
norms of uninhibited inquiry, open communication, or faculty advancement based on 
scholarly merit . . . [or] interfere[d] with other important avenues of transferring 
research results.”). 
 178. See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Access to Bio-Knowledge: From 
Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1 (2010) 
(providing an overview of this debate, including empirical studies suggesting that 
patents do not impede academic researchers in the ways that were predicted, but that 
restrictions on material transfers imposed by patent-conscious universities have made 
it more difficult for researchers to access materials). 
 179. See Bagley, supra note 26, at 217–18. 
 180. See generally Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the 
Patent System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2004) (finding a shorter lag between 
when work was presented at a scientific meeting and when it was published when the 
work was patented, suggesting that presentation was delayed until the work was 
complete, though it also might mean that scientists who seek patents are more 
efficient). 
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complementary, and that patenting academics may even produce more 
and higher-quality work.181 
The patent incentive might also affect the direction of university 
research by diverting scientists from basic work to more patentable 
applied projects.182 Of course, as noted above, academic researchers 
are somewhat constrained based on what projects they can receive 
funding for, so the direction of research may be driven more by 
decisions at funding agencies than by faculty choice.183 The line 
between basic and applied work is notoriously blurry, but self-
reported university survey results gathered by the NSF indicate that 
the share of academic research expenditures devoted to basic research 
increased from two-thirds in 1980 to three-quarters in 2009.184 
Similarly, Jerry Thursby and Marie Thursby’s study of faculty at eight 
major U.S. research universities from 1983 to 1999 found that 
 
 181. Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding & Toby Stuart, The Impact of Academic 
Patenting on (Public) Research Output, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 637, 637 (2009) (finding, 
based on a panel dataset of 3,862 academic life scientists, that “patenting has a 
positive effect on the rate of publications and a weak positive effect on the quality of 
these publications”); Azoulay, Ding & Stuart, supra note 157 (“Whereas previous 
research emphasized that academic patenters are more accomplished on average than 
their non-patenting counterparts, our findings suggest that patenting behavior is also 
a function of scientific opportunities.”); Brent Goldfarb, Gerald Marschke & Amy 
Smith, Scholarship and Inventive Activity in the University: Complements or 
Substitutes?, 18 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 743, 743 (2009) (finding, based on 
data from electrical engineers at Stanford, “no evidence that engaging in inventive 
activity reduces the quantity of scientific output and some evidence that it increases 
its quality”); Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto Di Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory: 
Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 37 RES. POL’Y 914, 914 (2008) 
(“[P]ublication and patenting are complementary, not substitute, activities for faculty 
members.”). But see Gustavo Crespi et al., The Impact of Academic Patenting on 
University Research and Its Transfer, 40 RES. POL’Y 55, 56 (2011) (finding, based on 
survey of UK researchers, that patenting and publishing are complementary up to 
about ten patents, after which there is some evidence for a substitution effect in 
chemistry and physics). 
 182. Fabrizio & Di Minin, supra note 181, at 917 (“The possibility to license-
patented research provides an incentive for researchers to focus more time on research 
projects with more commercial potential.”). 
 183. Though federal funding decisions are often made by other researchers 
through peer review. See, e.g., Peer Review, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer-review.htm [https://perma.cc/H36D-DNTX] (last 
updated Dec. 11, 2018). 
 184. SCHACHT, supra note 86, at 20. It is possible, however, that respondents’ 
views of “basic research” changed over time. See generally NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
Survey of Research and Development Expenditures at Universities and Colleges, 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyrdexpenditures [https://perma.cc/PYW7-MT4R] 
(last updated Oct. 1, 2009) (explaining information and data changes on the survey 
design for higher education). 
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scientists who filed invention disclosures with their universities’ 
TTOs tended to have a subsequent increase in basic research effort.185 
And David Mowery and colleagues concluded in 2001 that changes in 
university research portfolios reflected broader trends, and that “the 
Bayh–Dole Act itself has had little impact on the content of academic 
research.”186 More recent evidence suggests that while patenting tends 
to increase the rate of publication, it “may also modestly shift the 
content of these publications toward questions of commercial 
interest.”187 
In sum, survey evidence suggests that financial returns are only 
a small part of faculty incentives to patent, although this evidence 
presents the usual difficulties with self-reported motivations. And 
efforts to study the impact of Bayh–Dole on more quantitative metrics 
of university research suggest that patents are not substituting for 
publications or causing a marked shift in research focus, although it is 
difficult to extricate the effect of Bayh–Dole’s enactment from related 
trends in university research.188 
C. Effect of Variations in Financial Royalty Sharing 
As noted above, the Bayh–Dole Act requires universities to 
share some portion of patent royalties with inventors, and there is 
substantial variation across universities and over time.189 This source 
 
 185. See Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Has the Bayh–Dole Act 
Compromised Basic Research?, 40 RES. POL’Y 1077, 1081–83 (2011). They 
calculated basic research effort for faculty based on citation-weighted publications in 
more basic scientific journals. See id. As they note, these results depend on the 
appropriateness of their measure of basic research, and they are unable to determine 
whether more recently hired faculty have a different research focus. See id. at 1083. 
 186. Mowery et al., supra note 51, at 100; Bhaven N. Sampat, David C. 
Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Changes in University Patent Quality After the Bayh–
Dole Act: A Re-Examination, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371, 1388 (2003) (“Our 
analysis of citations to university patents before and after the Bayh–Dole Act suggests 
that there is no decline in the ‘quality’ of university patents during the 1980s.”). 
Relatedly, another study found “no difference between labs that encourage 
entrepreneurship and those that do not with respect to basic research activity and the 
number of publications.” Michael Roach, Encouraging Entrepreneurship in 
University Labs: Research Activities, Research Outputs, and Early Doctorate 
Careers, PLOS ONE, Feb. 8, 2017, at 1. 
 187. Azoulay, Ding & Stuart, The Impact of Academic Patenting, supra note 
181, at 668. 
 188. See Mowery et al., supra note 51, at 99 (“The evidence suggests that 
Bayh–Dole was only one of several important factors behind the rise of university 
patenting and licensing activity.”). 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.  
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of variation creates an empirical opportunity to determine whether the 
share of patent royalties actually has an observable outcome. 
The first researchers to exploit this opportunity were Saul Lach 
and Mark Schankerman, who collected royalty-share data from 102 
U.S. university websites in 2001, which they combined with AUTM 
survey data from 1991 to 1999.190 They found that a higher inventor’s 
royalty share was associated with higher licensing income at the 
university, controlling for other factors.191 This suggests that higher 
royalty shares caused academics to increase patent-related activity. 
Ouellette and Tutt, however, have determined that this result was 
caused by errors in coding university policies; when corrected, the 
association is no longer statistically significant.192 Ouellette and Tutt 
also performed independent analyses using an expanded range of 
years (1991 to 2013), additional outcome variables such as the number 
of invention disclosures filed with TTOs each year, and panel data 
analyses that took advantage of policy changes over time.193 None of 
these analyses support the claim that increasing the inventor’s share 
of patent licensing revenue in official royalty-sharing policies causes 
academics to increase their patent-related activity.194 
These results do not mean that financial incentives from patent 
royalties have no effect on university inventor behavior.195 Efforts to 
study this effect in the European context have had mixed results, with 
royalty sharing increasing university patenting in Italy,196 but having 
no impact in Portugal and Spain.197 The most compelling evidence that 
university professors are sensitive to their patent rights comes from 
Hans Hvide and Ben Jones, who found that Norway’s switch from full 
patent rights for researchers to the U.S. model, where the university 
holds title, led to a 50% decline in patenting rates and start-up 
 
 190. Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, Royalty Sharing and Technology 
Licensing in Universities, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASSOC. 252, 253–55 (2004) [hereinafter 
Lach & Schankerman, Royalty Sharing]; see also Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, 
Incentives and Invention in Universities, 39 RAND J. ECON. 403, 404 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lach & Schankerman, Incentives and Invention].  
 191. See Lach & Schankerman, Royalty Sharing, supra note 190, at 253; see 
also Lach & Schankerman, Incentives and Invention, supra note 190, at 427. 
 192. See Ouellette & Tutt, supra note 23.  
 193. See id. 
 194. See id.  
 195. See id. 
 196. See Nicola Baldini, Do Royalties Really Foster University Patenting 
Activity? An Answer from Italy, 30 TECHNOVATION 109, 114 (2010). 
 197. See Pere Arqué-Castells et al., Royalty Sharing, Effort and Invention in 
Universities: Evidence from Portugal and Spain, 45 RES. POL’Y 1858, 1867 (2016). 
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formation.198 It is unclear, however, how this policy change (a change 
in title) compares with varying the share of inventor royalty income 
within a system in which the university holds title. Additionally, the 
faculty labor market in Norway has important differences from the 
United States that might cause Norwegian academics to be more 
sensitive to additional income sources: salaries are collective 
negotiations between trade unions and the state, and overall 
compensation is comparatively low, with a maximum annual salary for 
full professors of 1,020,000 Norwegian kroner in 2008 (around 
US$140,000–200,000, depending on the historical daily exchange 
rate), and a median of 610,296 (around US$84,000–122,000).199 
As noted at the beginning of this Part, the literature on how 
different aspects of patents impact university researchers mostly 
consists of null results and context-specific findings, and studies of the 
financial impact of patent royalties are no exception. But we think 
there is currently no strong evidence that the prospect of patent 
royalties incentivizes publicly funded researchers to be more engaged 
in the patent system, much less to produce more or better research in 
the first place. 
IV. HOW DO PATENT REVENUES AFFECT UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 
FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING? 
A third potential benefit of university patents, in addition to 
providing ex post commercialization incentives and ex ante 
innovation incentives, is that they may help create additional funding 
for research and education in science and engineering. Of course, this 
is not why Bayh–Dole was enacted. As Rebecca Eisenberg and Robert 
Cook-Deegan note, this “argument was not even made” when Bayh–
Dole was debated, and “even now, the revenue-for-universities 
 
 198. See Hans K. Hvide & Benjamin F. Jones, University Innovation and the 
Professor’s Privilege, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 1860, 1860–61 (2018). 
 199. See SVEIN KYVIK, FORSKERFORBUNDET: NORDIC INST. FOR STUDIES IN 
INNOVATION, RES., & EDUC., ACADEMIC SALARIES IN NORWAY 5 (2010); U.S. Dollar 
to Norwegian Krone Spot Exchange Rates for 2008 from the Bank of England, POUND 
STERLING LIVE, https://www.poundsterlinglive.com/bank-of-england-spot/historical-
spot-exchange-rates/usd/USD-to-NOK-2008 (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). The value of 
a krone has fallen over time from the 2008 maximum of five kroner per U.S. dollar to 
over nine kroner per dollar today, making these salaries appear even lower to U.S. 
audiences. See U.S. Dollar to Norwegian Krone Spot Exchange Rates for 2020 from 
the Bank of England, POUND STERLING LIVE, https://www.poundsterlinglive.com/ 
bank-of-england-spot/historical-spot-exchange-rates/usd/USD-to-NOK-2020 (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
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rationale is raised only sotto voce, if at all.”200 And we think few would 
argue that funding research through patent revenue is the optimal 
solution in a world without political constraints: given the high 
transaction costs of the patent system, it seems highly unlikely to be 
more efficient than simply increasing federal grant funding.201 But in 
an era of declining federal science funding (as a percent of GDP202), is 
it possible that a patent shadow tax on university-developed 
technologies is the most politically feasible option for increasing 
direct R&D expenditures?  
In this Part, drawing on prior work, we explore two possible 
mechanisms through which Bayh–Dole patents might increase R&D 
funding.203 Section IV.A examines how Bayh–Dole patent revenues 
might increase internal university research funds, and Section IV.B 
examines how they might lead to higher federal grant appropriations 
in the first place. Note that for purposes of this revenue-generating 
theory, it does not matter whether the funding appears on the federal 
budget: “If universities receive additional revenues from Bayh–Dole 
patents and those revenues are reinvested in research, this is 
functionally equivalent to a tax on Bayh–Dole patent revenues that is 
returned to universities for new research projects.”204  
Overall, we think that, for Bayh–Dole patents not needed for 
commercialization, revenue generation must be considered to justify 
their use.205 This potential benefit has been underappreciated, perhaps 
 
 200. Eisenberg & Cook-Deegan, supra note 25, at 79. 
 201. As noted previously, even though the university patent “shadow tax” is 
not reflected in the federal budget, it is still very costly to consumers. See Hemel & 
Ouellette, Beyond the Patents Prizes Debate, supra note 19, at 312, 371–72. And the 
administrative costs of generating revenue through the patent system are significant. 
See id. at 364–66; see also James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from 
NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 410 tbl.5 (2014) (estimating that of the direct 
costs to defendants in patent lawsuits brought by non-practicing entities, only 
approximately 20% is passed through to R&D at the non-practicing entity or to 
inventors). 
 202. See Federal R&D as a Percent of GDP, AM. ASS’N FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (2018), https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-
public/RDGDP%253B.jpg [https://perma.cc/LMU9-UD9N]. 
 203. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, at 291–94; Hemel & Ouellette, 
Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 293–97. 
 204. Hemel & Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 293 
n.63. 
 205. Some commentators have argued that Bayh–Dole patents are useful even 
if universities lose money, but these arguments are premised on those patents serving 
commercializing benefits. See, e.g., Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh–Dole 
Act Turns 30, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 52cm27, 4 (2010) (arguing that the failure 
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due to a reluctance of TTOs to appear to be too focused on money. But 
if revenue generation is to justify the current extent of university 
patenting, TTOs must provide data and collaborate with scholars to 
make the case empirically and to study related costs, such as how 
patent revenues might exacerbate inequalities across universities or 
how aggressive patent assertion might undermine universities’ ability 
to argue for exceptional treatment within the patent ecosystem such as 
a broader experimental use defense.206  
A. Direct Funding from Net Patent Revenues 
Universities must reinvest Bayh–Dole revenues in science 
research and education. Under the statute, a grant agreement with a 
university or other nonprofit must include a “requirement that the 
balance of any royalties or income earned by the contractor with 
respect to subject inventions, after payment of expenses (including 
payments to inventors) incidental to administration of subject 
inventions, be utilized for the support of science research or 
education.”207 Peter Detkin, the owner of Intellectual Ventures, has 
argued that this requirement allows universities “to recoup their 
research dollars”—and that Intellectual Ventures has helped with this 
function by acquiring “rights to thousands of university patents,” 
licensing them, and returning about “$110 million to universities and 
government researchers” over a decade.208 
As a rare example in which the revenue rationale is raised at 
more than sotto voce, Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing 
(OTL) lists this benefit as the first argument “in support of licensing 
university inventions”: 
[W]hile the federal government has traditionally been the major sponsor of 
basic research conducted in universities, the current trend is to limit such 
funding. Universities thus are faced with the need to develop alternate 
 
of TTOs to generate revenue “simply verifies the institutional mission of the research 
enterprise: getting science into the public’s hands”). 
 206. For example, when narrowing the experimental use defense in Madey v. 
Duke University, the Federal Circuit noted “Duke’s patent and licensing policy may 
support its primary function as an educational institution. . . . Duke, however, like 
other major research institutions of higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an 
aggressive patent licensing program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue 
stream.” 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 207. Bayh–Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C) (1980); see also 37 C.F.R. 
§ 401.14(a)(k)(3) (1987) (providing the standard contract language). 
 208. Peter Detkin, Correspondence, Patents: Universities Are Right to 
Partner, 502 NATURE 448, 448 (2013). 
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sources of funding or to curtail their research activities. Licensing income 
can be a critical source of much-needed unrestricted funding.209 
In 2017, Stanford’s licensing office distributed $17.7 million to 
departments and schools,210 which is valuable funding, although this 
net revenue is just one percent of Stanford’s total $1.6 billion research 
budget.211 Another successful university technology transfer 
institution, WARF, provided $81 million in research funding to the 
University of Wisconsin at Madison in 2017,212 which is close to 7% 
of the total $1.2 billion research budget.213 These successful TTOs 
generate enough patent revenue to constitute a significant research 
funding source, though far from the amount needed to recoup their 
original research investments.  
And most universities aren’t Stanford. In fact, it is far from clear 
that the average university generates positive net revenue. The best 
existing source of evidence is the annual survey data from AUTM.214 
As Figure 4 shows, U.S. universities and nonprofit research institutes 
have been reporting gross licensing income in excess of their legal 
fees, and the gap between the numbers has grown over time, 
 
 209. Hans Wiesendanger, A History of OTL, STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF 
TECH. LICENSING, https://otl.stanford.edu/history-otl [https://perma.cc/3KQW-
9UVD] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020); Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make 
Patents Pay, 501 NATURE 471, 471 (2013) (“[T]he unstated aim [of university 
licensing] is to make money to fund more research and the technology-transfer office 
itself, says Melba Kurman, a former technology-transfer officer at Cornell . . . .”). 
 210. STANFORD UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. LICENSING, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: 
ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 11 (2017). Stanford brought in $45.4 million in gross 
royalty revenue and $2.5 million in liquidated equity, out of which it paid $10.4 
million to inventors in personal income, $0.9 million to other organizations for jointly-
owned technologies, and $19 million for the OTL operating budget and legal 
expenses. Id. at 11–12. 
 211. Research at Stanford, STANFORD UNIV., https://facts.stanford.edu/ 
research [https://perma.cc/RD7D-EYVX] (last updated Feb. 15, 2019). 
 212. Grants and Support: Current Grant, WIS. ALUMNI RES. FOUND., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180909045327/https://www.warf.org/stewardship/gra
nts-support/current/current-grant.cmsx [https://perma.cc/3HQ6-KNPF] (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2020); Frequently Asked Questions About WARF’s Purpose and Functions, 
WIS. ALUMNI RES. FOUND., http://www.warf.org/about-us/faqs/facts-about-warf-s-
purpose-and-functions.cmsx [https://perma.cc/G39U-VYRM] (last visited Jan. 20, 
2020) (“Since its inception [in 1925], WARF has provided $2.3 billion in cumulative 
direct grants . . . adjusted for inflation.”). 
 213. UW–Madison Retains Research Ranking, UNIV. WIS.–MADISON NEWS 
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://news.wisc.edu/uw-madison-retains-research-ranking 
[https://perma.cc/H243-FEHX].  
 214. See AUTM SURVEY, supra note 28. 
1374 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
suggesting a positive trajectory for net revenue averaged across 
universities.215  
 
Figure 4. Licensing Income and Legal Fees at U.S. Universities and 
Nonprofits 
 
 
But the AUTM survey data is missing many of the direct 
financial benefits and costs of patenting for universities. On the 
revenue side, the survey results do not seem to include revenue from 
selling equity in university start-ups (such as the $336 million Stanford 
made from its 2005 sale of Google stock216) or large damage awards 
from patent infringement lawsuits. 
On the cost side, the AUTM survey data only asks about legal 
fees. This number has not included significant litigation expenses 
since 1999, and it does not include TTO operating expenses.217 The 
AUTM survey does ask for the number of TTO employees, and Walter 
 
 215. Id. Over this time period, the number of reporting institutions ranged 
from 157 to 192. Id. 
 216. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Stanford Reaps Windfall from Google Stock, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2005), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-dec-02-
fi-calbriefs2.3-story.html [https://perma.cc/V6QC-U2KD]. 
 217. See AUTM SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 28, at 5 (contrasting 
“significant litigation expense” such as “any individual litigation expense that exceeds 
5% of total” legal fees, which have been excluded since 1999 to “eliminate skews in 
the data,” with “minor litigation expenses” such as “the cost of an initial letter to a 
potential infringer written by counsel,” which should be included in the costs reported 
to AUTM). 
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Valdivia has used this figure to estimate TTO operating expenses.218 
He concluded that “of the 155 universities reporting to the AUTM 
survey, 130 did not generate enough licensing income in 2012 to cover 
the wages of their technology transfer staff and the legal costs for the 
patents they file.”219 But Valdivia’s estimates relied on assumptions 
about average costs and did not account for the unreported revenue 
benefits discussed above. A 2007 survey of AUTM members found 
that just under half brought in more revenue than their operating 
costs.220 
Without more transparency about all the financial benefits from 
university patenting (including the value of equity and litigation 
awards) and the costs (including TTO operating expenses and 
litigation expenses), it is difficult to assess the revenue-generating 
function of university patents. But since there seem to be many 
university patents that cannot be justified from a social welfare 
perspective except as a means of generating additional revenue for 
research, we hope universities will analyze and share this data. 
B. Indirect Effects on Government Funding 
The prior Section focused on how patent revenues might directly 
increase universities’ internal research funds. But patent revenues 
might also increase U.S. spending on research grants through a more 
indirect mechanism, by causing higher congressional grant 
appropriations in the first place. In other words, the institutional 
structures that were catalyzed by securing and defending patent rents 
may change the public choice dynamics for other rents: greater 
research funding. As summarized by Hemel and Ouellette: 
 
 218. Walter D. Valdivia, University Start-Ups: Critical for Improving 
Technology Transfer, 2013 CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS 19 n.12 
(estimating operating expenses by assuming a salary of $150,000 per full-time 
employee specifically involved with patenting and licensing and $100,000 for other 
full-time employees); see also AUTM SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 28, at 9–10 
(defining these employee categories). 
 219. Valdivia, supra note 218, at 9; see also Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. 
Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh–Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 
(2003) (noting that in the 2000 AUTM survey, “half [of respondents] reported income 
less than $824,000” and “[o]n average, technology transfer offices below the median 
had four employees, which made it likely that many spent more than they received in 
income”). 
 220. See Irene Abrams, Grace Leung & Ashley J. Stevens, How Are U.S. 
Technology Transfer Offices Tasked and Motivated—Is It All About the Money?, 17 
RES. MGMT. REV. 18, 31 (2009). 
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Public choice theory suggests that members of Congress will support 
federal funding for scientific research so long as the political benefits (in 
particular, the benefits to well-organized interest groups) exceed the 
political costs (in the form of higher taxes). Interest-group support for 
federal research spending will be stronger when well-organized domestic 
constituencies stand to profit from federally funded inventions. . . . This is 
not to suggest that interest-group politics will produce an outcome in which 
public funding for scientific research exactly equals the national-welfare-
maximizing amount. It is to suggest, though, that the amount of funding 
seems likely to be positively correlated with domestic benefits, even if the 
correlation is far from perfect.221 
Indeed, universities have successfully lobbied for both increased 
research appropriations and against curtailment of their patent rights. 
The public and private universities with the largest R&D budgets 
lobby heavily during election cycles.222 They lobby for a variety of 
benefits, including earmarks for research projects (at least prior to the 
congressional earmark moratorium223), science policy including higher 
research funding,224 and favorable patent rights.225 Universities were 
 
 221. Hemel & Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 295–
96. 
 222. See Monica Vendituoli, Top Schools for Federal R&D Grants Are Big 
Spenders on Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, OPENSECRETS.ORG CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIVE POLITICS (June 5, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/06/ 
federal-research-and-development-fu/ [https://perma.cc/7U55-P5J6] (“Six of the top 
10 recipients of federal R&D money were among the top 10 university contributors 
to candidates, parties and outside groups in the 2012 cycle . . . .”). 
 223. See Andrew Kreighbaum, The Return of Earmarks, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/01/12/talks-restoring-
earmarks-promises-renewed-debate-within-higher-ed [https://perma.cc/R7MH-
3BSY] (describing universities’ mixed support for the 2011 earmark moratorium). 
 224. See Rick Cohen, Universities Pay Plenty for Influence and Access 
Through Lobbying, NONPROFIT Q. (July 5, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/ 
2014/07/16/universities-pay-plenty-for-influence-and-access-through-lobbying 
[https://perma.cc/3BN5-N4GM] (noting work “document[ing] the strong correlation 
between universities’ lobbying and campaign expenditures and their access to federal 
research and development grants”); John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 
How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic 
Earmarks 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13459, 2007) 
(noting, prior to the earmark moratorium, that “not all university lobbying is directed 
at obtaining earmarks[:] [a] small number of ‘elite’ universities lobby for science 
policy (for example, increased budgets for the National Science Foundation; or rules 
that will facilitate stem cell research)”). 
 225. See Joe Mullin, How the Patent Trolls Won in Congress, ARSTECHNICA 
(May 23, 2014, 5:08 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/how-the-
patent-trolls-won-in-congress [https://perma.cc/U2TV-9LFK]; see also Ryan & Frye, 
supra note 25, at 65 (“[T]he way that patent policy has bent toward rewarding 
university patent activity through conferral of rights is a direct result of lobbying and 
decision-making efforts by these universities with lawmakers . . . .”); Max Colice et. 
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ultimately able to grow their earmarks fifty-fold from 1980 (when 
universities started lobbying more heavily in response to funding 
cuts226) to 2001, with a strong return on lobbying investment.227 
Anecdotally, local economic benefits228 and successful 
commercialization are a helpful part of securing state funding. Beyond 
their commercial benefits, Dan Burk argues that patents play a 
ceremonial role, and a politically relevant one, communicating 
universities are “earning their keep . . . and not simply sponging off 
the largess of the taxpayers.”229 
The indirect effect described in this Section may be more 
economically significant than the direct revenue effect described in 
Section IV.A, though it is even more challenging to study empirically. 
It also may be sensitive to changes in public views about whether 
university patenting activities are making good use of research 
appropriations—including concerns about universities acting like 
“patent trolls”230 or using patents in ways that cause the public to “pay 
twice” for patented products.231 We think these concerns about how 
public perception of patenting behavior feeds back on other political 
benefits may be one of the drivers behind the shift toward a focus on 
start-up formation.232 The narrative of economic development through 
start-ups built around university patents has not acquired the same 
negative connotations of direct patent assertion, so invoking a start-
up-based narrative may lead to more funding.233 
 
al, Inside Views: Micro Entity Status for Universities and AIA Rulemaking on Power 
of Attorney, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 15, 2013), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2013/07/15/micro-entity-status-for-universities-and-aia-rulemaking-on-
power-of-attorney [https://perma.cc/C3QT-BUPC]. 
 226. See Celia Bever, The Way Things Work: University Lobbying, CHI. 
MAROON (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.chicagomaroon.com/2012/12/04/the-way-
things-work-university-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/BU3N-GK93]. 
 227. See John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, Academic Earmarks 
and the Returns to Lobbying, 49 J.L. & ECON. 597, 603, 616–17 (2006). Universities 
with representation on the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were 
especially successful in securing earmark funding. See id. at 612. 
 228. See Lee, supra note 123, at 1536 (noting how technology and economic 
benefits tend to flow in geographic clusters). 
 229. Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 446 
(2016). 
 230. See supra Section I.C. 
 231. See supra notes 5, 152. 
 232. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 233. We thank Arti Rai for this point. 
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V. WHAT EFFECT DO UNIVERSITY PATENTS HAVE ABROAD? 
So far, we have focused on university patenting from a U.S. 
perspective. But innovation institutions like grants and patents have 
effects that traverse national borders.234 Considering Bayh–Dole in a 
global context raises at least two key questions: First, should other 
countries adopt legal regimes modeled on Bayh–Dole? And second, 
what effect do patents filed outside a university’s home country have 
on the evaluation of that country’s Bayh–Dole regime? For example, 
does patenting by U.S. universities in foreign countries affect the 
social welfare assessment of the Bayh–Dole Act—and does it matter 
whether we consider U.S. or global welfare? Similarly, how do patents 
filed in the United States and other countries by Japanese universities 
affect the economic assessment of Japan’s 1999 laws modeled on 
Bayh–Dole?235 
This Part focuses on the second question, but on the first—
whether other countries should adopt legal regimes modeled on Bayh–
Dole—it is worth noting that many of the theoretical arguments 
canvassed above also apply to analogous legal regimes in other 
countries. For example, patents on inventions funded by the Japanese 
government have the same potential benefits for ex post 
commercialization, ex ante invention, and revenue generation as 
discussed in Parts II–IV. But this does not mean that empirical results 
from the United States on the size of these benefits (and of the 
corresponding costs) can be easily translated to other countries: the 
effects will vary based on the local context. As David Mowery and 
Bhaven Sampat noted in 2005, efforts to copy Bayh–Dole “are likely 
to have modest success at best without greater attention to the 
underlying structural differences among the higher education systems 
of these nations.”236 And translating work from the U.S. context to 
make recommendations for developing countries is even more 
fraught.237 
 
 234. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge 
Goods and Nation-States, 101 MINN. L. REV. 167 (2016) [hereinafter Hemel & 
Ouellette, Knowledge Goods]. 
 235. See generally Toshiko Takenaka, Technology Licensing and University 
Research in Japan, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. 27 (2005). 
 236. David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and 
University-Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, 
30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 115, 115 (2005). 
 237. See Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh–Dole Good for Developing Countries? 
Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2082 (2008) (arguing that 
“the appropriate sets of policies to harness public sector R&D are highly context-
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On the second question—the effect of university patents outside 
their home country—existing scholarship has primarily focused on the 
impact of U.S. patents on low-income countries. U.S. universities and 
other federal grant recipients may patent resulting inventions 
worldwide,238 and as we examine in Section V.A, U.S. university 
patents have played a role in limiting access to medicines in the 
developing world. Some advocates have argued that universities 
should use these patent rights to affirmatively promote global public 
health. 
But the Bayh–Dole debate has largely ignored the impact of U.S. 
university patents on consumers in other high-income countries like 
Japan and Germany. In collaboration with the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), Hemel and Ouellette have gathered 
detailed empirical data demonstrating that U.S. universities file a 
significant number of patents in high-income countries—and 
relatively few patents in lower-income countries.239 Section V.B 
reviews the argument that these patents in other high-income countries 
may have attractive efficiency and distributional effects. 
A. Access to Knowledge in Low-Income Countries 
Some of the most forceful critiques of university patenting 
behavior have focused on the role that U.S. university patents play in 
increasing the price of essential medicines for the global poor.240 
Patents’ role in contributing to high pharmaceutical prices in low-
income countries has been the subject of sustained criticism from 
academics, activists, NGOs, and international institutions.241 
 
specific” and that efforts to import Bayh–Dole to developing countries should reflect 
these differences). 
 238. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a)–(b) (setting forth the general rule that a 
contractor “may retain the entire right, title, and interest throughout the world to each 
subject invention”).  
 239. See Hemel & Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 
301. 
 240. See generally Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health 
Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan K. Doyle, The Global Health 
Licensing Program: A New Model for Humanitarian Licensing at the University 
Level, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 281 (2009). 
 241. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to 
Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 30, 33 
(2002). 
1380 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
There are at least some examples of how universities can 
affirmatively use their patents to promote global health, such as the 
story of Yale and d4T: 
[I]n 1990 Yale patented the use of the drug stavudine (d4T) to treat HIV 
and granted an exclusive license to Bristol-Myers Squibb. Under the trade 
name Zerit, stavudine became a key drug for treating HIV. With a cost of 
over $1600 per year, however, it was inaccessible to most patients in 
developing countries. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) wanted to distribute 
stavudine in South Africa. An Indian manufacturer offered to supply the 
drug for $40 per year, but MSF was unable to accept because Yale had 
patented stavudine in South Africa. With the help of Yale Law students 
Amy Kapczynski (now a [Yale] law professor) and Marco Simons, MSF 
approached Yale, which began negotiating with Bristol-Myers Squibb. 
After the issue was publicized in the New York Times, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
announced that it would not enforce the stavudine patent in South Africa 
and that it would sell Zerit in sub-Saharan Africa for $55 per year.242  
Based on this success at Yale, students formed the advocacy 
organization Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM) to 
consider “how universities can best license their innovations to 
promote global access.”243 UAEM now has chapters at over one 
hundred research universities.244 
A working group based at Yale and convened by UAEM then 
developed a proposal for a model “Equitable Access License,” which 
was described in a 2005 article by Amy Kapczynski, Samantha 
Chaifetz, Zachary Katz, and Yochai Benkler.245 The proposed 
licensing provisions would “give third parties—for example, 
manufacturers of generic medicines—freedom to operate in [low- and 
middle-income] countries with regard to the licensed technology or 
any derivative products, by adapting the so-called ‘copyleft’ 
characteristics of some open source licenses.”246 
In part because of this movement, AUTM and many of its 
university members have endorsed two policy statements setting out 
best practices for licensing in the public interest. The 2007 Nine Points 
 
 242. Ouellette, How Many Patents, supra note 94, at 309. 
 243. History, UNIVS. ALLIED FOR ESSENTIAL MEDS., https://uaem.org/who-we-
are/history [https://perma.cc/RZ4B-26L9] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). The focus has 
expanded to also consider “how universities can best direct and measure their research 
to have the greatest social impact worldwide.” Id. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 240, at 1031. 
 246. Id. at 1041; see also Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, at 296–97 
(describing the potential benefit of “Copyleft-Style Patent Licensing”). “Copyleft” is 
the use of copyright to promote free distribution of a work and of any future 
modifications of that work. 
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to Consider in Licensing University Technology urges universities to 
“[c]onsider including provisions that address unmet needs, such as 
those of neglected patient populations or geographic areas, giving 
particular attention to improved therapeutics, diagnostics and 
agricultural technologies for the developing world.”247 The Nine 
Points statement has over one hundred signatories.248 The 2009 
Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable 
Dissemination of Medical Technologies gives more specific goals to 
prevent patents from “becom[ing] a barrier to essential health-related 
technologies needed by patients in developing countries,” including 
“not patenting in developing countries.”249  
It is unclear, however, whether either of these statements has had 
any impact on university technology transfer practices. Neither policy 
statement has any transparency requirement or enforcement 
mechanism. And the Statement of Principles and Strategies does not 
seem to have acquired more than the original six university signatories 
and is no longer available on AUTM’s website. Furthermore, it is 
unclear how often U.S. university patents are actually an impediment 
to access to medicines in developing countries.250 
The leading study on university patents in developing countries 
in the pharmaceutical context is Bhaven Sampat’s investigation of 
patents on drugs approved by the FDA from 1988 to 2005.251 Sampat 
reports that 72 (7.7%) of these drugs had at least one academic patent, 
and that about 19% of those academic patents were filed in developing 
countries—those classified by the World Bank as low- or lower-
middle-income countries, which includes India, Brazil, and China.252 
Yale’s choice to patent d4T in the developing world was thus not a 
special case, although Sampat does not indicate which countries 
 
 247. CAL. INST. TECH. et al., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in 
Licensing University Technology 8 (Mar. 6, 2007). 
 248. See Nine Ponts [sic] to Consider in Licensing University Technology, 
AUTM, https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/principles-and-guidelines/nine-points-
to-consider-when-licensing-university [https://perma.cc/8LUE-9NJQ] (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2020). 
 249. AUTM ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES FOR THE 
EQUITABLE DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2009). 
 250. Kapczynski et al., supra note 240, at 1083 (“[T]here is no comprehensive 
data and no easy way to determine patent status in the majority of [low- and middle-
income] countries[.]”). 
 251. See Bhaven Sampat, Academic Patents and Access to Medicines in 
Developing Countries, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 9, 11 (2009). 
 252. Id. at 11, 14. 
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patents were filed in, including whether any were low-income 
countries. 
To help fill this empirical gap, Hemel and Ouellette worked with 
the WIPO Economics and Statistics Division to compile data on the 
number of distinct patent families filed by U.S. universities at national 
and regional patent offices from 2000 to 2011.253 During this period, 
36,943 patent families were filed by U.S. universities at the USPTO, 
of which over one-third (13,175 families) were filed at the European 
Patent Office (EPO) and close to one-quarter were filed in each of 
Canada (9,136 families) and Japan (8,348 families).254 Hemel and 
Ouellette noted that “although US universities do not seek foreign 
patents on a majority of their patentable inventions, they do file many 
patent applications abroad.”255 But these patents are not uniformly 
spread across the globe: 
[P]erhaps unsurprisingly, the number of patents filed in a given foreign 
jurisdiction correlates strongly with the size and strength of the local 
economy. US universities sought 59,750 patent families in high-income 
economies, 9616 in upper-middle income economies, 2952 in lower-middle 
income economies, and only 52 in low-income economies. And almost all 
of the patenting outside of high-income economies is in four large upper 
middle-income economies—China (5675), Mexico (1765), Brazil (1128), 
and South Africa (523)—and one large lower middle-income economy, 
India (2483). No other country outside the high-income world received 
more than 1 per cent of USPTO filings. While these five countries have 
significant poverty, they also have large economies: China has the second-
highest gross national income in the world, India is seventh, Brazil is eighth, 
Mexico is fifteenth, and South Africa is thirty-first.256 
To be clear, the relatively low numbers of university patents in low- 
and middle-income countries does not mean that these patents are not 
worth consideration. As Kapczynski and coauthors argue, “the more 
likely a technology is to have application in a developing country, the 
more likely it is the economics will weigh in favor of patenting.”257 
And even if patents are a tiny portion of the problem with access to 
medicines in the developing world, “preventing even a fraction of one 
 
 253. Hemel & Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, supra note 24, at 301 
(“A patent family is a group of patents—in the same or different countries—that 
protect a single invention. . . . Families are counted if any of the applicants are US 
universities as coded by WIPO . . . .”).  
 254. Id. at 303. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 305. 
 257. Kapczynski et al., supra note 240, at 1083. 
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percent of deaths in low- and middle-income countries would translate 
into saving tens of thousands of lives every year.”258 
But a full analysis of the impact of U.S. university patents abroad 
should consider more than their role in the poorest countries, given 
that universities patent far more in high-income countries. And as 
Hemel and Ouellette argue, “the global distributive justice concerns 
that come to mind when, say, patients in sub-Saharan Africa pay 
higher prices for a first-generation HIV treatment patented by Yale are 
less compelling when patients in Norway pay more for a hair loss 
treatment patented by the University of Central Florida.”259 
B. Cost Sharing Among High-Income Countries 
The significant number of U.S. university patents filed in other 
high-income countries may provide an overlooked—albeit partial—
justification for patents on federally funded inventions. In particular, 
Hemel and Ouellette argue that “[i]n addition to yielding arguably 
attractive distributional consequences” by having foreign consumers 
pay for the benefits they receive from inventions funded by U.S. 
taxpayers, “such patents may also increase efficiency: by allowing the 
[U.S.] federal government and [U.S.] firms to internalize some of the 
benefits that federally funded inventions bring to foreign consumers, 
Bayh–Dole may induce higher levels of [U.S.] public and private 
spending on research in the first place.”260 
This argument builds on the work of innovation economist 
Suzanne Scotchmer, who analyzed the problem of underinvestment in 
R&D in a world where many knowledge goods are global public 
goods.261 Scotchmer argued that in the absence of coordination, a 
country has “deficient incentives to invest, relative to what is 
efficient,” due to “uncompensated externalities abroad.”262 In other 
words, if a country cannot capture any of the benefits to foreign 
consumers from its R&D investments, it will have little reason to 
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consider these benefits in its investment decisions.263 This global 
collective action problem is to some degree addressed by IP treaties 
such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), which requires all 164 members of the 
World Trade Organization (except least-developed countries) to 
provide twenty-year patents in “all fields of technology” to inventors 
from other member states.264 Scotchmer was concerned, however, that 
coordination on IP rather than on public R&D sponsorship through 
grants would lead to “too little public sponsorship and too much 
intellectual property.”265  
But when coupled with Bayh–Dole regimes, the international IP 
system actually may help with this too-little-public-sponsorship 
problem. The resulting legal regime provides a mechanism for 
countries to internalize some foreign benefits from domestic R&D 
spending, at least when the results of that research are patentable.266 
For example, if an NIH-funded researcher at UC Berkeley invents a 
new drug that is patented worldwide and licensed to Pfizer, then 
foreign consumers will pay the patent shadow tax when this drug 
reaches their markets. This patent tax will be paid to Berkeley and to 
Pfizer—and then to the U.S. government through taxation of Pfizer’s 
profits. As noted above, Bayh–Dole contains an explicit preference for 
domestic manufacture, which would tend to keep profits within the 
United States.267 And the specific distribution of profits, including the 
amount reclaimed by the U.S. government, is a political choice of 
domestic tax law.268 
Of course, the fact that Bayh–Dole allows the United States to 
internalize some of the benefits in other high-income countries from 
its own public spending on grants does not mean that this function 
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increases the amount of direct R&D funding within the United States. 
As Part IV described, there are two theoretical mechanisms through 
which benefit-internalization might lead to higher spending: (1) more 
internal university research funds from Bayh–Dole revenues and 
(2) higher federal R&D funding in the first place. We think both of 
these are plausible, especially given concerns about technological 
free-riding by Japan at the time of Bayh–Dole’s enactment and by 
China today.269 U.S. science funding may be more politically 
vulnerable if critics could push the narrative that the fruits of this 
research were simply providing a free benefit to other countries. But 
there is not yet sufficient evidence to provide strong support for either 
funding channel.270 Rather, our goal is to highlight the overlooked 
global internalization theory of Bayh–Dole, and to urge universities 
and other parties with access to the relevant data to investigate this 
theory empirically. 
CONCLUSION: AN AGENDA FOR UNIVERSITY PATENTING RESEARCH 
As we have demonstrated throughout this Article, existing 
evidence on the benefits of patents on federally funded research cannot 
justify the Bayh–Dole Act’s present scope, or the current extent of 
U.S. university patenting more broadly. This observation is not novel: 
as noted in the Introduction, other prominent scholars have reached 
the same conclusion.271 And this lack of novelty simply underscores 
the importance of this point.  
The implication is straightforward: universities and other federal 
grant recipients should either limit exclusivity to only what is needed 
for commercialization or develop the evidence to justify greater patent 
rights. Universities could change their practices unilaterally, or they 
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could be pushed in this direction by either grant agencies or 
Congress.272 
We conclude by consolidating our analysis into the key 
questions we think universities should tackle—in collaboration with 
interested scholars—to develop a better evidence base for assessing 
the social impact of university patenting practices: 
Ex Post Commercialization: Does exclusivity actually aid 
commercialization outside the pharmaceutical industry? What fraction 
of university patents are exclusively licensed in different fields? When 
university patents are exclusively licensed, how often are there 
multiple interested parties, such that the university might be able to 
run a market-test exclusivity auction? Are there other ways to 
determine the extent to which exclusivity promotes commercialization 
for a given technology? Is there evidence that nonexclusive licenses 
promote commercialization in other ways, such as through tacit 
knowledge transfer? What metrics can be used to quantify university–
industry knowledge transfer outside patent licenses? Improvements to 
the Interagency Edison (iEdison) system for reporting on use of 
federally funded inventions, coupled with broader access to iEdison 
for researchers, could help address some of these questions.273 
Ex Ante Incentives: Does the ability of university researchers to 
gain a financial stake in their inventions spur more or different 
research? Do researchers care about the reputational effect of patents? 
How do the effects vary by field, by type of researcher, or over time? 
Do university patent practices affect researchers’ decisions to work in 
academia as opposed to industry, and what is the welfare impact of 
this choice? How do these answers vary by field? 
Revenue and Global Internalization: How much revenue do 
universities receive from patents, including sources of revenue that are 
not captured by the AUTM survey? How does this compare with the 
nearly $65 billion in university R&D funding? What fraction of rents 
from university patents are captured by the university, and where do 
the additional profits go? Is the answer different when considering 
foreign sales of products based on U.S. university inventions? 
 
 272. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 22, at 317–24 (describing the steps 
that could be taken by each of these institutional actors). 
 273. Cf. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 40 (“Federal research agencies 
should reinvigorate the requirement that institutions reliably and consistently provide 
data to iEdison on the utilization of federally funded inventions, including licensing 
agreements and efforts to obtain such utilization. Such data should be available for 
analysis by qualified researchers who agree not to disclose the parties to or terms of 
particular agreements.”). 
 University Patenting 1387 
Some of these questions can be answered by examining existing 
practices and datasets, but the most important questions will require 
rigorous policy experiments.274 It is difficult to understand the effect 
of university patenting based on comparisons before and after 1980 
because Bayh–Dole’s enactment corresponded with numerous other 
changes in the U.S. innovation ecosystem, as noted above.275 One 
approach for drawing more rigorous conclusions is to look for “natural 
experiments,” or variation that is close to random.276 But the most 
convincing evidence comes from controlled field experiments in 
which the relevant policy variation is actually randomized. Fruitful 
field experiments could be run by a number of institutional actors, 
including not just universities and federal funding agencies, but also 
private research funders. For example, a foundation that funds 
university research could run a randomized controlled trial in which 
different incentives are provided to different grant recipients. In light 
of the economic importance of university patenting and the limited 
evidence base for most of the key policy questions in this area, we 
think it is past time for scholars to partner with these institutions to 
test the most promising interventions. 
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